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Oscar Pistorius is known as the "fastest man on no legs."' Pistorius was
bom without fibula bones and consequently had both his legs amputated
below the knee at the age of eleven months.2 Despite this life-altering event,
Pistorius pursued his athletic aspirations,3 and is now a sprinter who runs
with the aid of carbon fiber prosthetic limbs called "cheetahs."
In 2004, Pistorius began competing with able-bodied sprinters in South
African events sponsored by the International Association of Athletic
Federations (IAAF).' Pistorius's continued demonstration of excellent
athletic talent prompted the IAAF to extend him invitations to compete
overseas. 6  As Pistorius's career expanded internationally, he continued to
perform well at home, placing second in the 400 meter race at the South
African National Championship in March 2007.' Although his time was not
fast enough to qualify him for the individual Olympic 400 meter race, this
second-place finish qualified Pistorius for the Olympic South African relay
team.' Pistorius's aspirations were soon quashed, however, for on March
26, 2007, the IAAF amended its rules to prohibit the "use of any technical
1. Ivo van Hilvoorde & Laurens Landeweerd, Disability or Extraordinary Talent-Francesco
Lentini (Three Legs) Versus Oscar Pistorius (No Legs), 2 SPORT ETHICS & PHIL. 97, 105 (2008).
2. Pistorius v. Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2008/A/1480 at 2 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport May
16, 2008) (Hunter, Rivkin & Rochat, Arbs.), available at http://jurisprudence.tas-
cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1480.pdf.
3. Pistorius has never considered himself disabled and has stated "[t]here's nothing I can't do
that able-bodied athletes can do." Jerd Longman, Debate on Amputee Sprinter: Is He Disabled or
Too-Abled?, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at Al. Pistorius participated in water polo, rugby,
wrestling, and tennis as a schoolboy. Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 2. It was only after a rugby injury
that Pistorius began to sprint as part of his rehabilitation program. Id. He began sprinting
competitively in January 2004. Id.
4. The Flex-Foot Cheetah® is manufactured by Ossur, an Icelandic company specializing in
non-invasive orthopedic devices including braces, support equipment, and prosthetic devices. See
About Ossur, http://www.ossur.com/?PagelD=12570 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). Designed to
imitate a full-functioning footlankle joint by storing and releasing energy, the Flex-Foot Cheetaho is
used by amputees who wish to sprint competitively or recreationally. Flex-Foot Cheetah" - Fast
Facts, http://www.ossur.com/?PageID-13462 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
5. Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 2. The IAAF is the world governing body for track and field,
including Olympic competition. See Int'l Ass'n Athletics Fed'ns Const. art. 3, §§ 1, 10 (2007)
(Monaco), available at http://www.iaaf.org/mm/Document/imported/9585.pdf.
6. See Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 2.
7. See Peter Charlish & Stephen Riley, Should Oscar Run?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 929, 930 (2008).
8. The South African relay team would compete provided it was among the sixteen fastest
teams in the world. See id.
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device that incorporates springs, wheels or any other element that provides
the user with an advantage over another athlete not using such a device."9
The IAAF subsequently withdrew Pistorius's invitation to compete in
the Norwich Union Glasgow Grand Prix,o almost certainly because the
federation believed that Pistorius's prosthetic devices violated the newly
enacted rule. Months later, the IAAF changed its position, allowing
Pistorius to compete pending an investigation into his eligibility." The
investigationl2 concluded that, based on metabolic and biomechanical
9. Int'l Ass'n Athletics Fed'ns, Competition Rules, R. 144.2(e) (2008), available at
http://www.iaaf.org/mm/Document/imported/42192.pdf. Some, including University of Miami
Medical School Professor Robert Gailey, have questioned the IAAF's motivation for enacting the
rule, suggesting that the IAAF may have had an intent to preserve the purity of Olympic sport rather
than maintain a level playing field. See Longman, supra note 3, at Al. Gailey inquires whether the
IAAF is "looking at not having an unfair advantage []... [or] discriminating ... because they don't
want to see a disabled man line up against an able-bodied man for fear that if the person who doesn't
have the perfect body wins, [that may say something] about the image of man[.]" Id. IAAF
President Lamine Diack suggests that the primary motivation in enacting the amended rule was to
prevent an unfair advantage. In a 2007 Press Release, Diack states,
I am a great admirer of the Paralympic movement, and I would like to take this
opportunity to congratulate Oscar on all his achievements to date. Yet now that Oscar
has improved his times to the extent that he is able to compete in open athletics
competitions, the IAAF has a duty to make sure that his prosthetics [sic] are analysed
carefully. We cannot permit technical aids that give one athlete an unfair advantage over
another. Personally, I am very pleased that Oscar has agreed to do this research with
Professor Brtiggemann, as the results will have very important implications for sports
science.
Press Release, Int'l Ass'n of Athletic Fed'ns, IAAF and Oscar Pistorius to Co-operate on Future
Research (July 26, 2007), available at http://www.iaaf.org/news/kind=101/newsid=39940.html.
IAAF council member Robert Hersh adds that "[the IAAF] did not legislate against [Pistorius's]
specific device because [it did not] look at his specific legs." Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 930.
However, the CAS Panel "considers it likely that the new Rule was introduced with Mr[.] Pistorius
in mind, and that it started the process that led to IAAF declaring him ineligible to compete in IAAF-
sanctioned events in January 2008." Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 7.
10. The Norwich Union Glasgow Grand Prix was scheduled for June 3, 2007. Pistorius,
2008/A/1480 at 3.
11. See id. Pistorius and the IAAF agreed to conduct a scientific investigation to determine
whether his use of prosthetic limbs gave him an advantage over other runners. See Press Release,
Int'l Ass'n of Athletic Fed'ns, supra note 9.
12. Professor Brfiggemann of the Cologne University's Institute of Biomechanics in Germany
led the investigation at the request of Dr. Elio Locatelli, who was appointed by the IAAF to evaluate
whether Pistorius's prostheses violated IAAF Rule 144.2(e). Pistarius, 2008/A/1480 at 3-4. The
investigation began with filming Pistorius in Rome on July 13, 2007 to evaluate the length of his
stride in comparison with other, similar runners. Id. at 7. It continued with biomechanical and
metabolic tests in Cologne. Id. at 7. During this second portion of the investigation, the IAAF
directed Briggemann to evaluate Pistorius after the acceleration phase, when Pistorius was running
in a straight line. Id. at 7. The CAS Panel criticizes the IAAF for this direction, stating that "IAAF's
officials must have known that, by excluding the start and the acceleration phase, the result would
create a distorted view of Mr[.] Pistorius'[s] advantages and/or disadvantages by not considering the
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evidence,13 Pistorius's prostheses provided him an advantage over runners
who did not use prosthetic limbs.14  This conclusion led the IAAF, on
January 14, 2008, to declare Pistorius ineligible to compete in IAAF-
sanctioned events. 5 Pistorius promptly appealed to the Court of Arbitration
for Sport,' 6 which, on May 16, 2008, overturned the IAAF's original ruling
on grounds of insufficient evidence of a net advantage over another athlete.17
As it stands, Pistorius is eligible to compete and is currently training for the
2012 Olympic Games to be held in London.' 8
Pistorius's internationally-publicized struggle for eligibility has drawn
attention to a dormant, yet dramatic controversy, one which pits sporting
ideals of fair play and excellence 9 against the civil rights of athletes with
effect of the device on the performance of Mr[.] Pistorius over the entire race." Id at 7. In further
support of the Panel's criticism, Professor Briggemann testified that he believed he was not
supposed to consider all of the advantages and disadvantages Pistorius experienced. Id. at 7. Prior
to the CAS appeal, it had been suggested that a better analysis would weigh both Pistorius's
individual advantages and his disadvantages to determine if a net advantage over other athletes
existed. See Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 936. "Even if it was proven that the limbs
themselves produced a real and obvious advantage, might such an advantage merely be viewed as
redressing the overall performance balance, and therefore may not be viewed as an advantage over
other elite athletes at his level of performance?" Id. For further discussion on the restorative
approach of accommodating disability, see infra note 84. The CAS panel ultimately questioned the
IAAF's method of assessment and disapproved of the way in which the IAAF handled the
investigation. See Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 7-9. Specifically, that Panel found that denying
Pistorius's scientist the ability to provide input and announcing results prematurely were especially
reprehensible. See id. As a result, the CAS began a de novo review of the evidence. See id at 9.
13. The IAAF council found a biomechanical advantage because "running with these prostheses
requires a less-important vertical movement associated with a lesser mechanical effort to raise the
body.. . ." Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 4. It found a metabolic advantage because "the energy loss
resulting from the use of these prostheses is significantly lower than that resulting from a human
ankle joint at a maximum sprint speed." Id. at 5.
14. See Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 937; Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 4-5.
15. Pistorius, 2008/A1480 at 5.
16. IAAF Competition Rule 60.11 states that an athlete may appeal a final decision exclusively
to the CAS. Id. at 5. According to IAAF Competition Rule 60.25, notice of appeal must be filed
within thirty days of the issuance of the final decision. Id. Complying with this rule, Pistorius gave
notice of appeal of the IAAF's January 14, 2008 decision on February 13, 2008. Id. While several
athletes with disabilities, such as Natalie du Toit of South Africa and Natalia Partyka of Poland, have
competed alongside able-bodied athletes, the CAS has only entertained one international challenge
to such competition, which arose in the dispute between the IAAF and Pistorius. See Paul Carter,
Games Without Frontiers, DISABILITY Now, Aug. 2008, at 31, 31 available at
http://www.disabilitynow.org.uk/living/features/games-without-frontiers. This is probably due to
the fact that athletes other than Pistorius do not use prosthetic devices, or other technologies that
may be considered performance-enhancing, during competition. See id at 31-32.
17. Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 12.
18. See Joshua Robinson, Pistorius Left Off South African Olympic Team, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2008, at DI.
19. It is important to note that society has a substantial interest in preserving sporting ideals
because sports contribute to the development of social skills in so many ways. Among other
valuable considerations, sports provide a forum for participants to learn such concepts as respect for
rules and the consequences of one's actions. Mr. Vyacheslav Fetisov, Head of the Russian
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disabilities. Those opposed to Pistorius's entry into able-bodied events
presume that his participation will jeopardize the fundamental principles of
sports.20 In fact, Pistorius's use of prosthetic devices has been labeled by
some as a form of performance-enhancement. 21 Proponents of Pistorius's
participation, however, insist that his civil liberties, and the civil liberties of
all disabled athletes, are at stake.22 At present, the net advantage test applied
by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in determining athletic eligibility
considers both positions, simultaneously safeguarding disability rights while
preserving the integrity of sports. However, the manner in which this test is
executed poses serious problems for athletes and athletic governing
organizations.
With that in mind, this Comment will explain the delicate balancing act
courts must perform when adjudicating disputes concerning disability
accommodation in sports, and will provide suggestions for improving the
Federation Agency for Physical Culture and Sport states,
The respect to the referee's decision must become the first step on a long way to the
respectful attitude towards the social rules and laws; the fulfillment of the sport rules and
regulations must help them step by step approach the comprehension and respect of the
rules of social life, the laws and the Constitution of their country.
Vyacheslav Fetisov, Head, Russian Fed'n Agency for Physical Culture and Sport, Address at the
Second Conference Sport and Development: Influence of Sport on the Social and Economic
Development 3 (Dec. 4-6, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.magglingen2005.org/
downloads/speech Vyacheslav%20Fetisov.pdf).
20. See generally notes 9-15 and accompanying text (discussing the IAAF's concerns and
findings with regard to Pistorius's use of prosthetic devices).
21. See id.
22. It is interesting to note that sports have often been a forum in which civil rights have
advanced. "Sports, like all of popular culture, become the theater where the taboos are
simultaneously smashed and reinforced, where one is liberated from them while conforming to
them." DAVID K. WIGGINS & PATRICK B. MILLER, THE UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN SPORT 434 (2003). On April
15, 1947, African-American Jackie Robinson stepped onto the Brooklyn Dodgers baseball field and
took his position at first base. ROBERT LIPSYTE & PETER LEVINE, IDOLS OF THE GAME: A SPORTING
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY 162 (1995). The "country held its breath" because
Robinson's professional debut "represented both the dream and the fear of equal opportunity...."
Id While integration did not occur overnight, Robinson's bold efforts to play professional baseball
"would change forever the complexion of the game and the attitudes of Americans." Id Sports
writer Roger Kahn observed that "[b]y applauding Robinson, . . .a man did not feel that he was
taking a stand on school integration or on open housing .... [, but] [t]o disregard color, even for an
instant, [represented a] step away from old prejudices ..... not a path on which many double back."
Id at 164-65. Robinson began the process of racial integration in professional sports, which
instigated the process of racial integration off the playing field. See BOB ABEL & MICHAEL
VALENTI, SPORTS QUOTES: THE INSIDERS' VIEW OF THE SPORTS WORLD 190 (1983). Indeed, it has
been noted that "[s]ports are not an idealization of ourselves, but a reflection." WIGGINS & MILLER,
supra, at 434. Similarly, sports may be on the brink of magnificent a transformation when it comes
to disability integration.
1351
process. To this end, Part II explores the ethical principles underlying
sports, for without this foundation, one cannot understand how to maintain
the integrity of a sport.23 Next, Part III discusses the history of disability law
and identifies its overarching theme as one of integration.24 Against this
background, Part IV discusses case law regarding disability accommodation
and sports, and it introduces the tests applied by the United States Supreme
Court and the Court of Arbitration for Sport in resolving these disputes.25
Part V offers a critique of the tests and suggests how they may be
improved.26 Finally, Part VI concludes the comment.27
II. AN ETHICAL APPROACH TO EVALUATING COMPETITIVE
CONDUCT IN SPORTS
Robert L. Simon, a renowned sports philosopher, states, "It is difficult to
understand how we could even identify abuses in sport unless we had some
grasp of the ethical principles that were being violated in the first place."28
Accordingly, before addressing what should be considered unfair conduct in
modem sports, the foundational principles of sports ethics must be
discussed.29
23. See infra notes 28-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 83-108 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 109-48 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 149-86 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
28. ROBERT L. SIMON, FAIR PLAY: THE ETHIcs OF SPORT 67 (2d ed. 2004). Simon further
states,
[W]ithout some standards at which to aim, we would not know the proper
recommendations to make for moral change.
... [H]ard cases are important because they force us to identify the relevant moral
factors that bear upon them and also require us to see whether our responses to a diverse
set of such cases can fit within a coherent and rationally defensible framework.
Id. Similarly, James Keating, another sports philosopher, sets forth the idea that the "nature of the
activity determines the conduct and attitudes proper to it." James W. Keating, Sportsmanship as a
Moral Category, in SPORTS ETHICs: AN ANTHOLOGY 63, 67 (Jan Boxill ed., 2003).
29. It is interesting to note a linguistic distinction between the terms "sport" and "athletics." The
term "sport" derives from the Old French word desporter, meaning "to carry away from work."
Keating, supra note 28, at 65. When defining "sport," many dictionaries reference terms such as
"'diversion,' 'recreation,' and 'pastime . . . .' Id. "In essence, sport is a kind of diversion which
has for its direct and immediate end fun, pleasure, and delight and which is dominated by a spirit of
moderation and generosity." Id. at 65-66. Consider the familiar saying originating with the
Sportsmanship Brotherhood founded in 1926: It's "[n]ot that you won or lost-but how you played
the game." Id. at 68. This statement is consistent with the idea of recreational sports. Id. However,
the linguistic origins of recreational sport are fundamentally different from the root meaning of the
term "athletics," which derives from the Greek words athlein, meaning "to contend for a prize[;]"
athlos, meaning "contest[;]" or athlon, meaning a "prize awarded for the successful completion of
the contest." Id. at 65. "Athletics . . . is essentially a competitive activity, which has for its end
victory in the contest and which is characterized by a spirit of dedication, sacrifice, and intensity."
Id. at 66. Considering this important distinction, James Keating asks,
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A. Exploring the Essence of Competition
Most definitions of competition can be reduced to terms that express the
purpose of competition as a pursuit of one of two objectives: victory or
excellence.3 o While it can be argued that competition embraces both ideas,
there can only be one true objective. Indeed, it seems that defining
competition's purpose in terms of victory may implicate moral concerns, for
obtaining victory necessarily requires defeating one's opponent. If this is
the ultimate aspiration, sport might be characterized as an inherently selfish
32
venture, or a zero-sum activity. However, as at least one critic asserts,
such a characterization is inconsistent with modem social values, as it is
morally reprehensible to pursue selfish interests at the expense of others.
3
Is this how one would describe the World Series, the Masters, the Davis Cup, the Rose
Bowl, the Olympic Games, or a high-school basketball tournament? Do the "sport"
pages of our newspapers detail the pleasant diversions and amusements of the citizenry,
or are they preoccupied with national and international contests which capture the
imaginations, the emotions, and the pocketbooks of millions of fans (i.e., fanatics)?
Id. at 65. According to Keating, it is due to this confusion that deciding appropriate conduct in the
modem sports context has become a difficult task.
Because the term "sport" has been loosely applied to radically different types of human
behavior, because it is naively regarded as an apt description of (1) activity which seeks
only pleasant diversion and, on the other hand, (2) the agonistic struggle to demonstrate
personal or group excellence, the determination of the conduct proper to a participant in
"sport" becomes a sticky business indeed.
Id. However, in lay terms, the words "sport" or "sports" generally refer to athletic competition, not
activities undertaken for recreation. As a result, this Comment will use the terms "sport," "sports,"
"athletics," and "competition" interchangeably.
30. See SIMON, supra note 28, at 24-28.
31. Those who define the nature of competition as a pursuit of victory may describe it as "the
struggle of two parties for the same valued object or objective[, which] implies that, to the extent
that one of the parties is successful in the struggle, he gains exclusive or predominant possession of
that object at the expense of his competitor." Keating, supra note 28, at 67. This is a zero-sum
result, meaning two athletes cannot share in victory, unless they are teammates. Id. at 68.
32. If "the goal of competition is to enhance the position of one competitor at the expense of
others[,]" then, "the critics argue,... by its very nature, competition is selfish." SIMON, supra note
28, at 24. In that regard, political theorist John Schaar views competition as "reduc[ing] human
interaction to 'a contest in which each man competes with his fellows for scarce goods, a contest in
which there is never enough for everybody, and where one man's gain is usually another's loss."'
Id.
33. See id "Since selfish concern for oneself at the expense of others is immoral, it follows that
competition is immoral as well." Id. Not only is the victory-based theory of competition morally
objectionable, the ideas of unrestricted competition and of winning at all costs are unrealistic. See
id. Sports are not only competitive, but also cooperative. See id at 24-25. Simon points to
scenarios where competitors offer assistance to one another, which directly contradicts the idea that
sport is completely selfish. See id. Cooperation thus makes competition ethically defensible. Id. at
25.
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Furthermore, obtaining victory does not always reflect success. As Simon
explains, a competitor may win against a weaker opponent and not
necessarily be successful, and, conversely, a competitor may lose to a
stronger opponent and feel a sense of success because he or she exhausted
every physical and mental faculty in the process.35 Finally, if victory truly is
the primary goal, competitors would simply seek to face inferior
opponents. 6
Accordingly, it may be more appropriate to define competition's
purpose in terms of excellence. Simon succinctly articulates this concept by
identifying competition as a "mutually acceptable quest for excellence
through challenge." 3 7  To expand on that idea, one might borrow from
Aristotle's definition of excellence, which he expresses as "a quite modest
set of virtues whereby humans should strive to be the best they can be given
the inheritance they receive from life and nature."38 Ideally, the foregoing
philosophical ideas of pursuing excellence allow a competitor to avoid
becoming immersed in selfishness by placing the highest importance on
improving oneself and improving one's opponents.3 9 Such an approach,
34. Moreover, it is important to note that not all victory is a reflection of excellence. In fact,
victory can be obtained through cheating, which is certainly not a measurement of excellence. See
id. at 19. Some argue that those who cheat cannot technically win because they do not play within
the rules of the game, and therefore do not play the game itself See id.
35. See id. at 27. Former president of St. John's College of Annapolis, Edwin Delattre,
comments that "moments of test rather than victory or defeat are the source of the value of
competition in sports." Id. at 26. According to Delattre, "[I]t is a far greater success in competitive
athletics to have played well under pressure of a truly worthwhile opponent and lost than to have
defeated a less worthy or unworthy one where no demands were made." Id. (quoting Edward J.
Delattre, Some Reflections on Success and Failure in Competitive Athletics, 2 J. PHIL. SPORT 134,134 (1975)). This statement suggests that winning is not the purpose of athletic competition. See id
at 26-27. Rather, competition's principal value lies in striving for excellence by overcoming
challenges. Id. at 27.
36. Id. at 53. Social and political philosopher, Jan Boxill, states,
Generally one prefers to lose against a strong opponent than win against no competition
at all. This is evidenced by the expression "hollow victory." Certainly winning is part of
the game (i.e. someone must win), but one sees an opponent not as an enemy to be
defeated, but as one whose excellences challenge and make possible one's own best
performance.
Jan Boxill, Introduction: The Moral Significance ofSport, in SPORTS ETHICS: AN ANTHOLOGY,
supra note 28, at 1, 6.
37. SIMON, supra note 28, at 27. Some have characterized sporting principles in terms of
"purity," stating that purity of sport should be maintained. However, "purity is far less meaningful
than sports' relationship with excellence. Translated into more robust terms, sport, particularly elite
sport, aims to foster and manifest excellence, by manifesting a standard that 'cannot be humanly
surpassed."' Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 954.
38. Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 954; see also Boxill, supra note 36, at 6 (stating that the
point of competition is "to function at a maximum, to develop oneself to the fullest .... .").
39. The idea of improving one's opponents contradicts the idea of victory as competition's
purpose. However, it furthers the concept of competition as a mutual quest for excellence. One can
only improve personal excellence by facing worthy opponents. Competition thus requires
cooperation because there is an "implicit social contract" between competitors to provide each other
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therefore, comports better with society's ethical ideals.40 And in this sense,
while victory is not eliminated as a component of competition, the
selfishness associated with it fades into the background and victory merely
becomes one of several ways to measure one's pursuit of excellence.41
With this in mind, often times in sports, and specifically in the disability
accommodation debate, competitors feel that the pursuit of excellence is
undermined when one athlete gains an unfair advantage over another. This
concern is legitimate, for an unfair advantage destroys the true challenge of
competition, and thereby compromises competition's entire purpose of
pursuing excellence. While this Comment ultimately addresses whether
disability accommodation in sports actually confers such an unfair
advantage, it must first examine the most effective method of preserving the
pursuit of excellence, the institution of standardized rules for each
competition.
the best challenge possible. See SIMON, supra note 28, at 27. If overcoming challenge furthers
excellence, "competitors should want their opponents at their peak so they can present the best
possible challenge." Id. at 34. Consider David Duval's comment on facing Tiger Woods: "If I come
head-to-head against him at say, the U.S. Open, I want him to be playing as good as he can play
because I want to beat him when he's playing his best." Id. at 53. Some have argued that this desire
for a true opponent changes when athletes compete in professional arenas, for monetary gain.
[T]here are added complications for the professional. Victories, superior performances,
and high ratings are essential to financial success in professional athletics. Too frequent
defeat will result in forced unemployment. It is easy, therefore, for a professional athlete
to view his competitors with a jaundiced eye; to see them as men who seek to deprive
him of his livelihood.
Keating, supra note 28, at 69. However, Simon asserts,
[R]egardless of the personal goals of the competitors,... professional athletes are
involved in the mutual quest for excellence at the highest level of attainable skill.
Many ... love the challenge provided by sports and seek to constantly improve their
performance.... Some professional star athletes, Michael Jordan and Tiger Woods
being especially prominent examples, seem to play as much for the love of the challenge
and the desire to compete as for the external rewards such as fame and fortune.
SIMON, supra note 28, at 70-71.
40. This is not to say, however, that striving for excellence necessarily occurs in every
competition. As Simon states,
Competition in sports is ethically defensible, in this view, when it is engaged in
voluntarily as part of a mutual quest for excellence.
This does not mean that all competition in sports is ethically defensible; actual practice
may not satisfy the requirements of the mutual quest for excellence. It does say that
competition in sports is ethically defensible when it does satisfy such requirements.
Id. at 27.
41. Simon classifies defeating one's opponent and winning the contest as an internal goal of
competition, meaning that the rules prescribe this goal as the result of competitive activity. See
SIMON, supra note 28, at 24. While winning may not be everything, "the outcome of the game is an
especially significant indicator of how well one actually played." Id. at 37.
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B. Preserving Competition by Promulgating Uniform Rules Focused on a
Fair Outcome
The rules set forth by athletic governing organizations attempt to create
a result that truly reflects the pursuit of excellence.42 This is accomplished
using two general types of rules: constitutive rules and regulatory rules.43
Constitutive rules set the framework for the particular competition, i.e.,
the activity and permissible moves within the activity." Playing within the
constitutive rules ensures that all competitors are indeed playing the same
game.4 5 Different competitions, however, seek to elicit different abilities, 46
42. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 703 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the very
nature of competitive sport is the measurement, by uniform rules, of unevenly distributed
excellence."). In addition to measuring excellence, rules may have the effect of curbing selfishness.
See Keating, supra note 28, at 68. Because two athletes cannot share victory, unless they are
teammates, rules may also have the effect of limiting the intensity with which victory is pursued.
See id. Consistent with this idea, Keating further states that athletes should "seek[] to
demonstrate ... excellence in a contest governed by rules which acknowledge human worth and
dignity." Id.
43. Graham McFee challenges the practice of strictly placing rules into two categories:
constitutive and regulatory. See GRAHAM MCFEE, SPORT, RULES, AND VALUES: PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF SPORT 43 (2004). In addition, he criticizes assigning
different functions to the categorized rules, stating "the argument seem[s] merely concessive: to
grant regulative force to constitutive rules. Yet the difficulty here is more profound." Id. McFee
claims the rules themselves are not necessarily constitutive or regulatory, but are used for
constitutive or regulatory purposes. See id. "[W]e should recognize regulative and constitutive uses
of rules, granting that a rule may be used in a regulative way in some contexts .. . and yet may also
be used constitutively . . . ." Id.
44. See Boxill, supra note 36, at 4; see also MCFEE, supra note 43, at 35 ("The rules of football
or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but ... create the very
possibility of playing such games." (quoting JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33-34 (1969))). However, not all sports have a defined set of
constitutive rules.
One example is mountain climbing. However, besides the rules for safety, there are
impositions that require bodily excellence and ingenuity, rules that require strategies for
climbing to reach the top. The goal is not just to reach the top, but to climb to reach the
top, and this requires adherence to rules, or laws, of nature. No artificial rules need be
imposed.
Boxill, supra note 36, at 4.
45. Playing the same game implies that all players reach the goal in a specified way. McFee
notes, "the rules of a game are inseparable from its goal. That is, the goal of golf is not simply to put
the ball in the hole, but to do so in a quite specified way-by using the fewest number of strokes
possible." MCFEE, supra note 43, at 15 (quoting William John Morgan, The Logical Incompatibility
Thesis and Rules: A Reconsideration of Formalism as an Account of Games, in PHILOSOPHIC
INQUIRY IN SPORT 50 (W.J. Morgan & K.V. Meier eds., 2d ed. 1995)). The "specified way" of
accomplishing the directives of a sport is vital. Some argue that because "competition in sport is the
attempt to secure victory within the framework set by the constitutive rules[,]" cheaters who act
outside the bounds of the rules do not actually play the same game. See SIMON, supra note 28, at 19,
46. "Cheaters violate the rules by failing to make moves within the sport and therefore fail to play it.
One can win the game only by playing it, and since cheaters do not play, cheaters can't win." Id. at
46.
46. See Boxill, supra note 36, at 4.
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and thus the constitutive rules vary with each contest. Unlike regulatory
rules, constitutive rules are not developed from logic, 47 but are often the
product of history, tradition, and current socially acceptable principles.48
Regulatory rules, on the other hand, are designed to determine which
actions constitute fair play,49 and which allow competitors to achieve an
unfair advantage.50  Such regulations place similar burdens on each
competitor by creating a "level playing field" at the outset," and imposing
Constitutive rules are designed to develop and exhibit distinct sets of skills and
talents. . . . These rules require calculations, decisions, strategies, and mental agility as
well as the meeting of a physical challenge. Thus, when I agree to play basketball, I
agree first of all to abide by the rules which define the game, and the rules of decency,
safety, and fair play within it. Further, I use these rules as a disciplined means of self-
expression and self-development.
Id (emphasis added).
47. van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 108-109 ("In sport there is no purely rational
logic in the definition of rules, neither in classification nor categorisations, in order to make the
competition as 'fair' as possible. Rules are always a combination and compromise of tradition and a
sport-ethical idea of 'equality' (the 'level playing field').").
48. See Boxill, supra note 36, at 4 ("Their existence comes from their acceptance.... The rules
of sport ... provide a framework for creativity in accordance with aesthetic standards, requiring both
mental and physical energies.").
49. Boxill characterizes regulatory rules as rules of safety, decency, and fair play. See id. The
topic of decency is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an in depth analysis of decency,
otherwise associated with sportsmanship, see generally Keating, supra note 28, at 63-71 (discussing
the moral nature of sportsmanship). However, for purposes of this Comment, fair play and, to some
extent, safety are pertinent. Yet, the concepts of decency, safety, and fair play may overlap. See
Boxill, supra note 36, at 4. Boxill states, "For example, in boxing one cannot hit below the belt; in
football one cannot tackle by grabbing the face mask or tackle a non-ball carrier from behind; in
baseball one cannot throw at the batsman's head; in cricket one cannot continually bowl bodyline,
etc." Id. These examples explicitly address safety and decency concerns. Id. The first example
cited above, hitting below the belt during a boxing match, is primarily prohibited for the safety of the
boxer receiving the hit. However, "[r]ules of decency[, which] reflect basic moral standards[,]" are
also implicated because it would be wrong, ethically speaking, to seriously injure another competitor
for a moment advantage. See id. Finally, "[r]ules of fair play[, which] include penalties for moves
of strategy within the game[,]" are also involved. See id Hitting below the belt is certainly
strategic, but outside the bounds of the game. Thus, because the action is not part of the constitutive
rules, a penalty is assigned, the penalty acting as the regulatory rule.
50. While there are rules designed to ensure fair play, some argue that fair play may be avoided
when rules are waived.
According to [the Professional Golf Association], "the goal of the highest-level
competitive athletics is to assess and compare the performance of different competitors, a
task that is meaningful only if the competitors are subject to identical substantive rules."
The waiver of any possibly "outcome-affecting" rule for a contestant would violate this
principle and therefore . . .fundamentally alter the nature of the highest level athletic
event.
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 686 (2001) (citation omitted).
51. See Keating, supra note 28, at 70.
Both contestants must be equal before the law if the test is to have any validity, if the
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penalties for deviation from the rules during the competition. 2 This ensures
that every competitor is measured based on athletic ability rather than
external factors.
By preventing an unfair advantage, the rules of each sport ensure that
victory is both a reflection of a true challenge and an accurate measurement
of excellence. In essence, "competitive sport is best understood . .. [as an]
attempt [by athletes] to develop excellence[] [while] overcoming the
obstacles allowed by the rules."54
C. An Unfair Advantage: The Nemesis of Competition
A competitor may gain an advantage in a number of ways, including
through the use of performance-enhancers. While the use of performance-
enhancing techniques generally carries a negative connotation, some
methods by which athletes increase their performance are consistent with the
ethical foundation of sports. To this end, there is an important distinction
between striving for excellence, which necessarily requires personal
victory is to have any meaning. To the extent that one party to the contest gains a special
advantage, unavailable to his opponent, through an unusual interpretation, application, or
circumvention of the rules, then that advantage is unfair. The well-known phrase "sense
of fair play" suggests much more than an adherence to the letter of the law. It implies
that the spirit too must be observed. In the athletic contest, there is a mutual recognition
that the rules of the game are drawn up for the explicit purpose of aiding in the
determination of an honorable victory. Any attempt to disregard or circumvent these
rules must be viewed as a deliberate attempt to deprive the contest of its meaning.
Faimess, then, is rooted in a type of equality before the law, which is absolutely
necessary if victory in the contest is to have validity and meaning.
Id.
52. See SIMON, supra note 28, at 19, 57.
53. See infra Parts II.C.1-2 (discussing how external factors such as performance-enhancing
substances or equipment can change the nature of the challenge from testing the competitor's athletic
ability to testing the competitor's ability to respond to a drug or a piece of equipment).
54. SIMON, supra note 28, at 52.
55. There are several arguments against performance enhancements, both in and out of the sports
context. Perhaps one of the most compelling is that, traditionally, performance enhancers are not
natural. Professor Michael Shapiro of the University of Southern California has suggested that
nature should be the guide when determining which forms of human enhancement are acceptable.
See Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection: Performance Enhancement and the Control
ofAttributes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 11, 59 (1991). While natural physical or intellectual endowments
are unearned, society views them as meritorious "while drug responsiveness is not.... Perhaps [this
is] because we have no choice concerning the distribution of baseline-forming native endowments,
which are unearned, but we do have a choice concerning the generation of enhanced endowments,
which are also unearned." Id. at 61. In essence, this argument provides that those qualities over
which one has no choice are valuable. However, people choose to improve themselves on a daily
basis. See infra note 56 (discussing that self-improvement is not limited to sports, but is also sought
after in daily activities). It would be ludicrous to ban all activity undertaken for self-improvement
purposes. The logical conclusion is that society has a "preference for internally- over externally-
driven changes, the former being associated with nature, and the latter with non-nature or artifice."
Shapiro, supra, at 54 (emphasis added).
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improvement,56 and gaining an unfair advantage by circumventing the
challenges of competition. This distinction, however, is blurred as
technology enters the debate. Technology's continued development and its
increasingly important role in athletics raise questions of whether certain
forms of technology "fall[] under the traditional category of improving the
athletic playing field[,] or if these innovations eliminate athletic talent as a
prerequisite for competition and provide an unfair advantage . . . ."" This
section explores technological enhancement in sports and analyzes various
techniques as they relate to the foundations of sports ethics.
1. Performance-Enhancing Substances May Allow Athletes an
Upperhand at the Cost of Undermining Competition
Taking performance-enhancing substances may internally alter the
athlete and thus may compromise the challenge presented by an individual
sport. In that regard, substances are the most regulated form of performance
56. Personal improvement is not unique to sports.
Most of us strive to be able to do things we now can't do, or to do things better-to think
and work faster and more accurately, to jump higher, to use a machine gun more
effectively, and so on. We rarely think that in so striving and succeeding, personal
identity has been compromised or that some serious moral harm has occurred.
Shapiro, supra note 55, at 16 (citation omitted). Very often in this everyday quest for self-
improvement, technology plays a role. For example, although some may not consider coffee a form
of technology, it certainly is a stimulant. However, consumption of coffee does not carry a general
negative connotation, but is universally accepted for its ability to increase awareness, and sometimes
even efficiency. Indeed, people around the world consume it daily for these very purposes. See
CORBY KUMMER, THE JOY OF COFFEE 153-55 (2003). In fact, this overall acceptance occurs
despite the fact that the effects are due to the introduction of a substance into one's body, which
could be viewed as "artificial." Shapiro posits that self-improvement is part of human nature, stating
"[i]t is natural for us to pursue the artificial." Shapiro, supra note 55, at 35. There is, however, a
distinction between everyday life and sports. While performance is important in life in general,
competitive sports rely on participants to consistently perform at peak levels.
[In life, t]here are no clear wins or losses and no generally accepted way of keeping
score. Most of the rules are not written down. People juggle multiple goals, and duties,
rather than concentrating all their efforts on improving their performance in one of their
lives' many "events." We are not, for the most part, one bad performance away from
being fired. We are not too old to work in our profession at thirty-five, as in the NBA, or
thirty, as in professional tennis, or twenty, as in Olympic gymnastics. Most of us, most
of the time, do not always try to be "the best," but instead we seek to be good enough.
Henry T. Greely, Disabilities, Enhancements, and the Meanings of Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 99, 132 (2004). Indeed, "from the viewpoint of athletic performance ... the idea of normality
seems irrelevant: one wants to get far beyond it." Shapiro, supra note 55, at 50. But see infra note
I t (discussing the idea that elite athletes are themselves abnormal, but that society places positive
value on their particular abnormalities).
57. Erin E. Floyd, Comment, The Modern Athlete: Natural Athletic Ability or Technology at Its
Best?, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 155, 166 (2002).
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enhancers.58 Such heavy regulation could further be attributed to the fact
that drugs are easier to regulate than other forms of performance
enhancement,59 or it could also be due to society's general bias against
drugs.60
Society's bias may be justified for several reasons. First, athletes who
use performance-enhancing substances, such as anabolic steroidS61 or
58. See Greely, supra note 56, at 128. For the most part, individual athletic governing
organizations regulate performance-enhancing substances, with governments adopting the policies
implemented by these private organizations. In 1999, the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
created the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), with a goal to establish a drug-free sports culture.
See Jarred R. Tynes, Comment, Performance Enhancing Substances, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 493, 506
(2006). WADA's rules, which create strict liability for substances found in an athlete's body, have
since been adopted by all major international sports organizations and several governments. See id
The United States government has not formally adopted WADA's rules, but the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC) created the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) in 2000,
which adopted the WADA code in 2004. Id. at 506-07. Although the United States government has
not specifically regulated doping in domestic sports, Congress has passed several acts concerning
drug use for the general population. In 1970, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) provided
criminal penalties for drug-related offenses. See id. at 498. In 1990, the Anabolic Steroids Control
Act was enacted, specifically targeting hormonal substances related to testosterone and, under the
CSA, providing for penalties for use of such substances. See id at 498-99. In professional sports,
the major American sports associations, such as the National Basketball Association (NBA), the
National Football League (NFL), and Major League Baseball (MLB), have created rules that provide
for drug testing, education, and treatment. See Floyd, supra note 57, at 159-61. In addition, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) imposed drug testing procedures and
consequences on its athletes beginning in 1973. Id at 163-65. Most of these organizations cite
athletes' health and fair competition as the reasons for enacting such measures. See id. at 159, 164.
59. See Greely, supra note 56, at 129-30. Greely suggests that because controlled drugs may be
accessed only through medical providers, it is easier to enforce distribution regulations. See id. at
130. Greely contrasts the ability to control drug distribution with the concept of controlling workout
regimens or other means of enhancing performance, stating that enforcement of such regulations
would be impractical. Id.
60. See Greely, supra note 56, at 129-30. Greely indicates that society would probably view
control of a personal workout as an invasion of privacy, whereas regulation of substances is
generally considered legitimate. See id. Greely also points out that there are certain substances that
are generally accepted as unregulated such as coffee, nicotine, and, to some extent, alcohol. See id.;
see also supra note 56 (discussing how, outside of the context of athletics, enhancing one's
performance through quasi-technological means is a natural and generally-accepted practice).
61. The use of anabolic steroids can cause physical and psychological harm to athletes.
Some physiological side effects include decreased sperm production, enlargement of
breast tissue, over-retention of fluid leading to hypertension or heart disease, and
biochemical effects on the liver....
Aside from the physical effects steroids can have on the human body, steroids may also
result in psychological damage. The most common psychological effect is aggression,
commonly called "roid rage."
Tynes, supra note 58, at 495-96 (citations omitted). United States legislation has been enacted to
prohibit steroid use. See supra note 58. Anabolic agents are also included on WADA's list of
prohibited substances. See World Anti-Doping Agency, The World Anti-Doping Code: The 2009
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ephedrine,62  put their safety at risk. Second, some characterize
performance-enhancing substances as unnatural,6" and a threat to the value
of effort and hard work.6 ' Third, if substances are unregulated, the
competitive aspect of sports may coerce otherwise-unwilling athletes into
partaking when they do not wish to do so.6 6  Fourth, not all athletes have
62. Ephedrine can also pose serious health risks for athletes. In 2003, Steve Belcher, a pitcher
for the Baltimore Orioles, suffered from heatstroke while running sprints and ultimately died from
multiple organ failure. See Rafael Hermoso & Charlie Nobles, Lessons Learned from Past Use of
Ephedra, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at D3. Doctors concluded that ephedrine found in Belcher's
dietary supplement contributed to his death. See id Commenting on the improper uses of
ephedrine, Dr. Lewis Yocum states, "The biggest problem I see is close monitoring and what's in the
supplement.... You're supposed to take one or two, and people take three or four. . . ." Id. Just as
in Belcher's case, exceeding the correct dose of ephedrine can cause "increased blood pressure and
other stresses to the circulatory system linked to heart problems and strokes." Tynes, supra note 58,
at 497.
63. See Greely, supra note 56, at 129-30. Greely believes the safety argument to be the most
persuasive. Id. at 130. While health risks associated with traditional performance-enhancing
substances are generally known, many athletes are not deterred from using potentially life-
threatening substances. A poll at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics revealed that fifty-five percent of
athletic participants "would take a drug that could kill [them] five years later if it enabled them to
win a gold medal." Shapiro, supra note 55, at 86. In fact, the most effective way for athletes to
avoid endangering their lives is through threat of adverse consequences to their careers. See Tynes,
supra note 58, at 494 ("[M]any athletes are not willing to curb the use of such substances absent a
threat of serious punishment issued by the body controlling their sport."). Prohibiting steroid use for
the protection of athletes may seem like a noble venture, but it is met with opposition by those who
consider it a form of paternalism, and a deprivation of individual liberty. See SIMON, supra note 28,
at 73.
If widespread paternalism were practiced, third parties could prohibit us from eating
foods that might be harmful, playing in sports that carried even slight risk of injury, or
indulging in unhealthy lifestyles. Our lives would be monitored-for our own good, of
course. The difficulty is that we might not conceive of our own good in the same way as
the paternalist.
Id. Simon further cites John Stuart Mill who posits that deprivation of liberty is only justifiable to
prevent harm to others. See id. In essence, if one chooses to put himself at risk, he should be free to
do so. See id. at 73-74.
64. See discussion supra note 55. This argument is interesting, because, while the dosage of
some of these substances may be unnatural, the substances themselves typically come from nature.
For example, anabolic steroids derive from the human hormone, testosterone. See SIMON, supra
note 28, at 72.
65. While society values natural endowment, it also recognizes merit through effort. "Present
understandings of sport do not include the ability of an athlete's body to respond to a drug as an
element of the contest." Warren P. Fraleigh, Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Sport: The Ethical
Issue, II J. PHIL. SPORT 23, 28 (1985). However, it can also be said that substances are not magical,
rather that they "yield improvement only in conjunction with hard training and a demanding work
ethic; they allow muscles to recover faster and so permit more intense and more frequent workouts
than nonusers are able to manage." SIMON, supra note 28, at 84.
66. If a professional athlete's livelihood depends on competitive success, and the chances of
success are increased when performance-enhancing substances are used, some argue that athletes
may feel forced to use substances in order to compete. SIMON, supra note 28, at 75. This argument
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equal access to certain substances, which alone may create an unfair
advantage.67 Fifth, even if availability were not an issue, some still believe
that use of these substances would be "too easy," and thus unfair. This
argument is one of the most persuasive when viewed through the lens of
sports ethics. If competition is viewed as a mutual quest for excellence
may be rebutted by the theory that no one is truly forced into athletic competition in the first place;
rather, participation is a choice. See id Simon analogizes further by indicating that such a theory as
applied to students seems out of place.
Do professors similarly "coerce" students into studying hard? Isn't it more plausible to
say that although there are pressures on athletes to achieve peak physical condition, these
amount to coercion no more than the pressures on law or medical students to study hard?
Rather, the athletes (or the students) have reasons to try hard to achieve success; the
pressures are self-imposed.
Id. Perhaps the coercion argument is not meant to affect the individual athlete's choice, but seeks to
prevent the athlete from being presented with this choice at all. "[W]e need to consider whether it is
morally wrong to insist that athletes risk harming themselves to compete." Id. at 78.
67. The expensive nature of performance-enhancing substances may lead to a situation where
some athletes can afford these drugs while others cannot. See Greely, supra note 56, at 129. The
resulting inequality in terms of access could be seen as providing an unfair advantage, something
sport seeks to eliminate. See supra Part II.A. However, other forms of acceptable performance-
enhancement, such as training and equipment, also have limited access due to expense and location,
and are not generally viewed as providing an unfair advantage. See Greely, supra note 56, at 129. It
is also interesting to note that performance-enhancing drugs may be expensive because they are
banned. See id. Perhaps eliminating the ban on performance-enhancing substances in athletics
would eliminate the access and unfair advantage problems as well.
68. Of course, if the use of a particular substance is banned by the rules of the competition,
breaking these rules would be considered cheating. See SIMON, supra note 28, at 79. Some argue
that even if permitted by the rules of the game, use of performance-enhancing substances makes
success "too easy." See Greely, supra note 56, at 129. However, if this theory relies on the
argument that the drug rather than the human is being tested, the same can be said of high-tech
equipment, professional training, and specialized diets, all of which are considered legitimate means
to improve performance. See SIMON, supra note 28, at 80.
69. Illustrating just how deeply sports ethics influence society, in his very first presidential press
conference on February 9, 2009, President Obama addressed concerns on taking the "easy" path
toward a goal. See Obama 's Prime-Time Press Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/us/politics/09text-obama.html?pagewanted=13&_r-2. When
questioned about Alex Rodriguez, a Major League Baseball player who admitted using performance-
enhancing drugs, President Obama expressed his hope that children would learn a valuable lesson:
while circumventing a challenge may be beneficial in the short-run, the long-term effects of
jeopardizing one's integrity are not worth the temporary advantage. See id The pertinent portions
of the transcript are as follows:
QUESTION: Yeah, thank you, sir. What's you're [sic] reaction to Alex Rodriguez's
admission that he used steroids as a member of the Texas Rangers?
MR. OBAMA: Yeah, I think it's depressing news on top of what's been a flurry of
depressing items, when it comes to Major League Baseball.
And if you're a fan of Major League Baseball, I think it-it tarnishes an entire era, to
some degree. And it's unfortunate, because I think there are a lot of ballplayers who
played it straight.
And you know, the thing I'm probably most concemed about [is] the message that it
sends to our kids.
What I'm pleased about is, Major League Baseball seems to finally be taking this
seriously, to recognize how big of a problem this is for the sport, and that our kids
hopefully are watching and saying: You know what? There are no shortcuts; that when
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through challenge, substances may circumvent the challenges, thus defying
the ethic of competition itself.70 Ultimately, the foregoing concerns lead to
the conclusion that, on the whole, performance-enhancing drugs jeopardize
the integrity of sports," and thus should be banned.72
you try to take shortcuts, you may end up tarnishing your entire career, and that your
integrity's not worth it. That's the message I hope is communicated.
Id
70. SIMON, supra note 28, at 83 ("If competition in sports is supposed to be a test of the athletic
ability of persons, isn't the very heart of competition corrupted if results are affected by
performance-enhancing drugs?"). Simon argues that the use of substances to increase performance
changes the very nature of sports because "[i]nstead of meeting the challenge of the test, we change
the nature of the test takers to minimize the challenge they face." Id. at 85 (emphasis added). In
essence, the test would transform into a test of how efficiently one's body reacts to a substance,
rather than how one reacts to the challenge. See id "We want the winner to be the best athlete, not
the individual whose body is best attuned to a performance-enhancing drug!" Id Indeed, Shapiro
conveys a similar argument:
[I]t isn't just enhanced performance that we are after. In addition, we want athletic
competition to be a test of persons. It is not only raw ability we are testing for; it is what
people do with their ability that counts at least as much.... [Ihf outcomes are
significantly affected not by such features but instead by the capacity of the body to
benefit physiologically from drugs, athletes are no longer reacting to each other as
persons but rather become more like competing bodies.
Shapiro, supra note 55, at 60 (quoting Robert L. Simon, Good Competition and Drug-Enhanced
Performance, 11 J. PHIL. SPORT 6, 7 (1985)). Simon compares this to specialized equipment, which
threatens to replace the test of an athlete's skill with the test of equipment. See SIMON, supra note
28, at 84-85. Simon further suggests that the use of technological aids could turn competition into a
test of machines rather than of man. See id. at 85. He questions whether this situation is a true
reflection of sport. See id Ultimately, he distinguishes equipment on the ground that it must still be
used by persons. Id
71. On the issue of the integrity of sport, Shapiro quotes Roger Gardner and George Will.
Gardner states, "[G]aining enhancement (speed, endurance, strength, power, physique, etc.) through
certain substances is unacceptable because it threatens a sport's integrity. The substance, in the end,
is more responsible for any gained advantage than is the athlete, and hence we are no longer testing
the athlete but the substance." Shapiro, supra note 55, at 73 (quoting Roger Gardner, On
Performance-Enhancing Substances and the Unfair Advantage Argument, 16 J. PHIL. SPORT 59, 70
(1989)). George Will further argues, "Sport would be debased, and with it a society that takes sport
seriously, if sport did not strictly forbid things that blur the distinction between the triumph of
character and the triumph of pharmacology." Id. at 73 (quoting George F. Will, Character Not
Chemistry, Must Take the Gold, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1988, at 7).
72. Shapiro discusses arguments that, perhaps, performance enhancement on the whole should
not be banned. See id at 65.
The ideas of equality and fairness in contests thus suggest only that if [performance
enhancement] is banned, the ban should be enforced. It does not show that [performance
enhancement] should be banned in the first place, unless perhaps the [performance
enhancement] mechanism works so differently on different persons that categorical
inequality comes about, making contests pointless.
Id. Further, "[performance enhancement] might deserve support as a way of promoting equality" for
those who do not receive natural endowments. Id at 76. Indeed, it has been argued that sports in
general may benefit from permitting performance enhancement. It may "push[] athletes to new
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2. Performance-Enhancing Equipment May Represent Innovation in
Sports Rather Than a Threat to Ethics
While similar arguments concerning unfairness and availability may be
applicable to both drugs and the use of equipment, the stigma associated
with drugs73 typically does not attach to equipment.7 4 Equipment, however,
is still subject to regulation," partially because technological innovations
may threaten the challenge of competition much like performance-enhancing
substances.7 6 Some have gone so far as to refer to performance-enhancing
equipment as "technological doping."n Consider the controversial and very
public debate over Speedo's LZR Racer swimsuit leading up to the 2008
Olympic Games. The LZR, which allegedly reduces drag in the water and
stabilizes a swimmer's core,78 was ultimately permitted in the Olympics 79
levels." Floyd, supra note 57, at 174.
73. Shapiro, supra note 55, at 88-89 ("[S]teroid use, despite its limited effects, does seem to be
taken by many as an attempt to secure unearned benefits, to get something for nothing.... [S]ocio-
political systems [have] expectations of community intervention of certain sorts.").
74. Olympic gold medalist Donna de Varona comments that "[tiechnological advances, whether
(pole vaulter) Bob Seagren's fiberglass pole or new speed skates in the Winter Games, are simply
part of sport." Christine Brennan, Sink or Swim? Not with this Suit, USA TODAY, June 29, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/brennan/2008-06-29-swim-suitsN.htm. The sand
wedge golf club reduces the challenge encountered when one's golf ball lands in a sand bunker. See
SIMON, supra note 28, at 84. Yet, this is considered innovation, not an unfair advantage. See id.
75. Beginning in 1863, baseball bats were formally regulated, setting limits on diameter and
requiring that the bats be round and made of wood. See MARCIA L. WALKER & TODD L. SEIDLER,
SPORTS EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT 2 (1993). Regulation of baseballs soon followed, in 1866, and
was later modified in 1910 when the center of the ball was changed from rubber to cork. Id. See
generally id at 2-5 for a discussion of the development of equipment regulations.
76. Indeed, during recent United States litigation against equipment manufacturers, athletic
associations have raised the argument that certain equipment may threaten the competitive challenge
and thus should be regulated. See Floyd, supra note 57, at 168 (explaining the associations' position
that "[i]f equipment becomes 'so sophisticated that one cannot adequately distinguish the relative
skill levels of the participants in their performances, the very nature of the sport is irrevocably
altered' (quoting Daniel E. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An Antitrust Analysis, 34
GA. L. REv. 137, 162 (1999))). Conversely, the manufacturers allege that regulation of equipment
violates antitrust laws and have thus attempted to prohibit athletic associations from restricting the
use of their products. See generally Lazaroff, supra (discussing the controversy between sports
equipment manufacturers and sports regulatory authorities). Athletic associations have not only
responded with the argument that they have the right to preserve the integrity of sport, but also that
certain equipment threatens the safety of athletes. See Floyd, supra note 57, at 168.
77. Karen Crouse, Scrutiny of a Swimsuit Rises as Records Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, at
D2 (quoting Italian National Team Swim Coach Alberto Castagnetti). While Castagnetti certainly
has a point, it may be possible that when disability is concerned, such a classification is
inappropriate. See infra note 84 (discussing the argument that accommodation of a disability in
sports may accomplish a restorative function, rather than conferring an advantage).
78. The LZR Racer swimsuit is made from "densely woven nylon-elastane material that
compresses the wearer's body into a hydrodynamic shape but is extremely light." Making No
Waves, THE ECONOMIsT, June 12, 2008. Instead of traditional seams, the LZR employs ultrasonic
welding, which reduces the amount of drag the swimmer experiences in the water, up to six percent.
See id. The polyurethane material decreases drag up to an additional twenty-four percent. See id In
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despite the fact that it faced resistance from those claiming it conferred an
advantage upon its users.so
One reason advanced swimsuit technology is permissible may be that
the swimsuits do not present safety concerns for athletes.8' However,
considering the element of unfair advantage, the more compelling
explanation of why equipment and substances are treated differently lies in
the amount of human effort required. The use of prohibited substances is
generally viewed as reducing or completely bypassing the challenge
presented by sports, whereas the use of equipment is not. This may be due
to the fact that "[a]lthough technological improvements in equipment do
yield advances in achievement, the equipment must still be used by [a]
person[]."82
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF DISABILITY LAW:
A MOVE TOWARD INTEGRATION
Thus far, certain types of performance-enhancing techniques have been
discussed, some of which confer an unfair advantage on a competitor. One
could argue that some disability accommodations provide a similar unfair
addition, the suit stabilizes the swimmer's core, causing the wearer to use up to five percent less
oxygen. See id.
79. CBC News, FINA Approves More High-tech Swimsuits, CBC SPORTS, June 5, 2008,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2008/06/04/olympics-speedo-suit.html.
80. While the data regarding drag reduction and decreased oxygen use has led some to attribute
the recent surge of new world records to the LZR swimsuit, others consider the suit a permissible
technological development that improves performance. Michael Phelps's coach, Bob Bowman
comments, "The swimmer makes the suit, not the other way around." Keith Naughton, Making a
Splash, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 2008, at E6. Still others are concerned that, similar to golf and tennis,
the sport of swimming will become driven by equipment. "The turbulent times for swimming and
the focus on technology is reminiscent of the changes in tennis and golf, when wooden rackets and
old-school tennis clubs went to the back of the garage for good, replaced by their sleeker composite
cousins." Lisa Dillman, As Swim Records Fall, High-tech Suit Faces Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2008, at Al.
81. Conversely, regulation of aluminum bats in American collegiate baseball has been altered not
only for reasons of unfair advantage but also for the safety of the athletes. See Floyd, supra note 57,
at 171-72. In fact, safety has always been a valid argument to permit technological innovations. See
id at 174 (discussing the permissibility of helmets in various sports). Other arguments in support of
allowing equipment to be used without heavy restrictions have also been advanced. For example,
the use of nitrogen tents to increase endurance has not been prohibited. Nitrogen tents increase the
number of red blood cells in the body, thereby increasing the flow of oxygen to the blood and
organs. See Greely, supra note 56, at 114. The argument to continue to allow nitrogen tents is
furthered because not only do these tents fail to endanger athletes, but they also simulate natural
conditions experienced in high altitude, and thus, theoretically, do not destroy the challenge. See id.
82. SIMON, supra note 28, at 85.
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advantage. However, for the most part, accommodations of this nature are
meant to be restorative, thereby leveling the playing field for all athletes,
disabled or otherwise.84 Thus, an absolute prohibition on disability
83. See infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing the Pistorius and Martin cases).
84. See S.D. Edwards, Should Oscar Pistorius Be Excluded From the 2008 Olympic Games?, 2
SPORT ETHICS & PHIL. 112, 121 (2008). Edwards notes that "some commentators have argued that
it is just to introduce some compensatory measure to "level out" inequalities that result from the
consequences of the natural and social lotteries." Id. Will Kymlicka, a Canadian political
philosopher, states,
People born into a disadvantaged class or race should not be denied social benefits, but
also have a claim to compensation because of that disadvantage. Why treat people born
with natural handicaps any differently? Why should they not also have a claim to
compensation for their disadvantage .. . in addition to their claim to non-discrimination?
Id. (quoting WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 72-73 (1990)). Allen
Buchanan and his colleagues add that "[e]qual opportunity . .. requires efforts to counteract the
effects of all factors beyond an individual's control . . . ." Id. (quoting ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL.,
FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 67 (2000)). Edwards suggests a possible
solution: develop handicaps to level the playing field for such athletes.
[W]e should find differing starting lines: one for those athletes brought up in
geographical regions congenial to the development of performance-enhancing capacities.
They would be alongside those who benefited from "undeserved" advantages. Further
up, towards the finishing line, one would expect to find another starting line, this one
being for those athletes who have had to overcome undeserved disadvantages stemming
from the poor deal they got from the natural lottery. Due to the disadvantages the natural
lottery has bestowed on [Pistorius], and the obligation to compensate for these, it could
be expected both that he would be eligible to compete in the Olympics (even with a
slower qualifying time) and that he would start closer to the finish line than other athletes
who have not had to overcome comparable disadvantages.
Id. at 122. Although not directly applicable to sports, in the same vein, political theorist John Rawls
recommends "balanc[ing] individual liberty with an equal distribution of liberty. This should be
combined with a provision of the greatest benefit for the least advantaged." van Hilvoorde &
Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 102. As Michael Shapiro states, "To protect, restore, or create normal
or natural functioning seems presumptively legitimate to most . . . ." Shapiro, supra note 55, at 50.
In an analogous discussion on gene therapy, Shapiro states that "the idea of nature as a guiding
model for right action is tempered by invoking a disorder model in which interventions into nature
are permissible, desirable, or even obligatory when justified by the goal of dealing with disorder-
even though disorder may be natural." Id at 54. "It may be hard to distinguish between attempts to
control disorder or disability and attempts to enhance or augment the normal." Id at 48. Consider a
medical procedure as simple as setting a fractured bone. Such an act could be viewed as restorative,
in that it places a fractured bone back to into its natural position. Conversely, it could be viewed as
enhancement, in that it intervenes through an unnatural process. But the setting of a fractured bone,
while arguably an unnatural procedure, is accepted by society for its restorative value, for "[it seems
unfruitful to view setting a fracture as changing the trait of having a cracked bone. Nor is it a clear
case of enhancement." Id. at 49. Another example is an emerging and more complicated procedure
called platelet-rich plasma therapy, whereby doctors "inject[] portions of a patient's own blood
directly into [an] injured area ..... Alan Schwarz, Patient's Own Blood Shows Promise in Healing
Injuries, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 17, 2009, at Al. Several recreational and professional
athletes utilize this procedure, which allows ligament and tendon fibers to regenerate, for injury
treatment purposes. See id. Among these athletes are some of sport's most prominent figures, such
as Hines Ward and Troy Polamalu of the Pittsburgh Steelers, who underwent this treatment prior to
winning the 2009 Super Bowl. See id Arguably, this could be considered a form of performance
enhancement. However, as Dr. Allan Mishra of Stanford University Medical Center comments, "It's
a better option for problems that don't have a great solution-it's nonsurgical, and uses the body's
own cells to help it heal . . . ." Id.
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accommodation is unwarranted. Rather, prior to barring an athlete with a
disability from competition, an individual assessment must be conducted to
carefully weigh the fundamental civil rights at issue against concerns for
competitive equality. In essence, in order to justify a denial of equal access,
those charged with such a task must ensure that an advantage occurs to such
an extent that it becomes unfair.
In order to complete this analysis, one must reach an understanding of
the development of disability legislation and the intent behind such
enactments. Hence, this section briefly recounts the history of prominent
disability legislation.
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
to address the prevalent discrimination against persons with disabilities.8 1
Congress found that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious
and pervasive social problem."8 Further, Congress noted that people with
disabilities not only experience discrimination as a result of "outright
intentional exclusion," but also due to a "failure to make modifications to
existing facilities and practices."8 Accordingly, the ADA reflects the
85. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). A statement from the Congressional floor debate during the ADA
hearings may give insight into why such pervasive discrimination occurs:
[O]ur society is still infected by the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that
people with disabilities are less than fully human and therefore are not fully eligible for
the opportunities, services, and support systems which are available to other people as a
matter of right. The result is massive, society-wide discrimination.
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv.
393, 409 (1991) (quoting S. COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, REP. ON THE AMERICANS
wITH DISABILITIES ACT, S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 8-9 (1989)).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). These acts of exclusion and refusal to modify policies and
practices in the disability context are equivalent to the acts and treatment that spawned legislation to
combat racial discrimination.
Congress made it plain in the ADA's legislative history that it believed the evils of
segregation by race to be the same as the evils of segregation by disability. Congress
regarded Brown [v. Board of Education] as an equally important basis for eradicating
disability segregation as it had been in striking down classifications based upon race.
Cook, supra note 86, at 410. In discussing how discrimination can permanently affect "hearts and
minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone," the Congressional committees likened the struggles of
individuals with disabilities to the hardships endured by those subject to racial discrimination. See
id. at 410 n.120 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). "Separate is not equal.
It was not for blacks; it is not for the disabled." Id. at 423 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act:
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expectation that individuals with disabilities be fully integrated in society,
stating that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity [and] full participation."
While the ADA has been praised for its comprehensive nature,89 there
are exemptions for certain private organizations such as "private clubs or
establishments" and "religious organizations or entities."90 However, as the
Supreme Court noted in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, "Congress made no such
exception for athletic competitions, much less did it give sports
organizations carte blanche authority to exempt themselves from the
fundamental alteration inquiry." 91 Consequently, domestically, there is no
reason to believe that disability accommodation in sports should be viewed
any differently than disability accommodation generally.
B. The United Nations Convention on the Rights ofPersons with
Disabilities
The most widely-recognized international declaration concerning
disability rights is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (the Convention). The Convention seeks to defend the
fundamental human rights of those with disabilities.9 3  In doing so, the
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1989) (statement of former Sen. Weicker)). Further, the
Senate Report states that "'[olne of the most debilitating forms of discrimination is segregation
imposed by others,' which 'has very serious consequences. It destroys healthy self-concepts and
slowly erodes the human spirit."' Id at 410-11 (quoting S. COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN
RESOURCES, REP. ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989)).
Committee members concluded that just as "separate but equal" violated civil rights in a racial
discrimination context, so it violated civil rights in a disability discrimination context. See id As a
result, "[u]nder the ADA, classifications that segregate persons with disabilities are henceforth to be
presumptively illegal and given the same scrutiny under the ADA as classifications based upon race
are given under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act of
1964." Id at 397.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006). "The law seeks to integrate disabled people into mainstream
society, especially within the economic and social fabric of our nation." Paul Steven Miller, Book
Review, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619, 619 (2007) (reviewing RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY
PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2005)).
89. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001). The ADA prohibits employment
discrimination based on disability, ensures that public entities provide equal access to programs and
services, and mandates that private entities provide equal access to places of public
accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12187.
91. Martin, 532 U.S. at 689 n.51.
92. See UN.org, UN Enable - Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). The Convention was
adopted on December 13, 2006, and opened for signature on March 30, 2007. See id. With the most
signatures of any UN Convention in its opening day, the Convention gained eighty-two signatures
and one ratification. Id. Forty-four signatures were obtained for the Optional Protocol. Id.
93. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, G.A. Res. 61/106,
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Convention recognizes that discrimination "hinders ... full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others .. . Integral
components of the Convention thus include recognizing the valuable societal
contribution of those with disabilities95 and "mainstreaming disability
,,96issues .. .. Indeed, as it applies to athletic competition, the Convention
encourages "participation, to the fullest extent possible, of persons with
disabilities in mainstream sporting activities at all levels . . . . Because
several countries have either chosen not to adopt the Convention or instead
have adopted the Option Protocol, 98 internationally, the Convention lacks the
U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/106, available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/
convoptprot-e.pdf. The Convention "[r]eaffrm[s] the universality, indivisibility, interdependence,
and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and the need for persons with
disabilities to be guaranteed their full enjoyment without discrimination . . . ." Id. pmbl. (c).
Further, "discrimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent
dignity and worth of the human person ..... Id. pmbl. (h).
94. Id. pmbl. (e).
95. True to its foundational human rights principles, the Convention recognizes the individual,
declaring,
[Tlhe valued existing and potential contributions made by persons with disabilities to the
overall well-being and diversity of their communities, and that the promotion of the full
enjoyment by persons with disabilities of their human rights and fundamental freedoms
and of full participation by persons with disabilities will result in their enhanced sense of
belonging and in significant advances in the human, social and economic development of
society and the eradication of poverty ....
Id pmbl. (m).
96. Id. pmbl. (g).
97. Id. art. 30.5(a).
98. For instance, in the case of Pistorius, the CAS discussed the Convention, but found it
inapposite to the controversy.
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional
Protocol ... was adopted on 13 December 2006 at the UN Headquarters in New York,
and was opened for signature on 30 March 2007. It came into force according to its
terms (Art.45), thirty days after the twentieth ratification was deposited, on 3 May 2008.
Signing a Convention may create an obligation, in the periods between signing and
ratification, to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
Ratification is an action taken by States that signal an intention to undertake legal rights
and obligations contained in the Convention or the Optional Protocol.
Pistorius v. Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2008/A/1480 at 9, (Ct. of Arb. for Sport May 16,
2008) (Hunter, Rivkin & Rochat, Arbs.), available at http://jurisprudence.tas-
cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1 4 8 0.pdf As it pertains to Pistorius,
Disputes arising under the IAAF Rules shall be resolved in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules. The Parties agree that the law applicable to substantive issues is
the law of Monaco, as the law governing the IAAF Constitution pursuant to its Article
16.
None of [the aforementioned] act[s of ratification] have been taken by the
Principality of Monaco, and [thus] the UN Convention has not been enacted in its Law.
Id. Furthermore, the CAS found the issue of disability discrimination to be exactly that which they
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mandatory effect of legislation such as the ADA in the United States.
However, it remains a sweeping declaration, which mirrors the ADA in its
focus on integration.
While these two examples of disability rights legislation certainly do not
reflect the views of every nation,99 they reflect the overarching international
theme of integration as it concerns disability rights. Further, it is apparent
from these enactments that integration is not meant to cease when applied to
athletic competition.
C. The Only Real Limitation for Athletes with Disabilities is Exclusion
from Mainstream Competition
International and domestic policies suggest that social values have
shifted from seeking to exclude or ignore those with disorders and
disabilities to an attitude of integration.'00 Indeed, just as the racial civil
rights movement declared that segregation was no longer an option, perhaps
the disability civil rights movement is headed that direction.'r It seems that
were deciding in applying the net advantage test.
[T]he Convention would not be engaged in the circumstances of this appeal. By way of
example, [Convention] Article 30.5 provides that Contracting State shall encourage and
promote the participation of persons with disabilities in mainstream sporting activities at
all levels with a view to enabling them to participate on an equal basis to sporting
activities.
In other words, disability laws only require that an athlete such as Mr[.] Pistorius be
permitted to compete on the same footing as others. This is precisely the issue to be
decided by this Panel: that is, whether or not Mr[.] Pistorius is competing on an equal
basis with other athletes not using Cheetah Flex-Foot prostheses. As counsel for the
IAAF rightly mentioned, if this Panel finds that Mr[.] Pistorius' Cheetah Flex-Foot
prostheses provide no advantage to Mr[.] Pistorius, he will be able to compete on an
equal basis with other athletes. If the Panel concludes that Mr[.] Pistorius does gain an
advantage, the Convention would not assist his case.
Id. at 9-10. Therefore, the CAS Panel declined to consider Pistorius's discrimination claim, finding
it was encompassed within its net advantage analysis. See id at 10.
99. For a complete discussion of international disability legislation, see Wendy Scott, Guide to
Sources in International and Comparative Disability Law, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 621(2007).
100. van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 103 ("The worldwide trend is on appreciating,
embracing, and celebrating individual differences as opposed to glorifying the norm, the normal, and
normalisation as was done in the 1900s." (quoting C. Sherill, The Changing Terminology of
"Ability" and "Disability" in the Sport Context, in PARALYMPIC GAMES FROM 1960 To 2004, at 9(E. Kioumourtzoglou & K. Politis eds., 2004))). United States Congressional intent behind the ADA
supports integration and the United Nations's intent behind the Convention calls for
"mainstreaming" persons with disabilities. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Congressman
Miller states, "In fact . . . it has been our unwillingness to see all people with disabilities that has
been the greatest barrier to full and meaningful equality. Society has made them invisible by
shutting them away in segregated facilities ..... Cook, supra note 86, at 424.
101. See supra note 87 (discussing how Congress considers segregation of those with disabilities
tantamount to racial segregation, and clearly rejects the practice in both senses).
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the most effective way to stop segregation is to actively integrate.102 There
is no logical reason that sports, especially Olympic sports, should be exempt
from these principles.
Consequently, while the Paralympics is a progressive step toward
integration,103 some believe that athletic opportunity for individuals with
disabilities should not be limited to this forum. Rather, athletes with
disabilities should have the option to participate in both the Paralympics and
the Olympics.104 Others contend that allowing athletes with disabilities to
compete in the Olympics will negatively impact the Paralympics, essentially
turning the Paralympics into a "B final."os While such an argument may
have merit, proponents of the former argument point to the already-
perceived (albeit distorted) status of the Paralympics as second-rate
102. See Cook, supra note 86, at 441. According to Congressman Collins, "If we have learned
any lessons in the last 30 years, it is that only by breaking down barriers between people can we
dispel the negative attitudes and myths that are the main currency of oppression." Id.
103. The Paralympic Movement is a noble venture and a vital means of integrating individuals
with disabilities into the world of sports. The International Paralympic Committee (IPC), a non-
profit organization, was founded on September 22, 1989. See Paralympic.org, Official Website of
the Paralympic Movement, IPC, http://paralympic.org/IPC (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). It is
comprised of 165 National Paralympic Committees from around the world and represents a variety
of sports and disabilities. Id The IPC governs the Paralympic Games. Id.
The word "Paralympic" derives from the Greek preposition "para" ("beside" or
"alongside") and the word "Olympics" (the Paralympics being the parallel Games to the
Olympics). The word Paralympic was originally a pun combining 'paraplegic' and
'Olympic,' however with the inclusion of other disability groups and the close
associations with the Olympic Movement, it now represents 'parallel' and 'Olympic' to
illustrate how the two movements exist side by side.
Id The vision of the IPC is as follows: "To Enable Paralympic Athletes to Achieve Sporting
Excellence and Inspire and Excite the World." Paralympic.org, Official Website of the Paralympic
Movement, Vision, Mission & Values, http://paralympic.org/IPC/Vision-MissionValues.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2009).
104. Former Olympic athlete Iwan Thomas states,
I can totally understand [the argument that participation in the Olympics will have a
negative effect on the Paralympics] ... but the fact is that [Pistorius] needs to run against
the quickest athletes he can. He's already achieved great things in the Paralympics, and
he's proved that he's head and shoulders above the competition there.
... [I]f he's going to improve and compete at the highest level, he needs to progress.
Carter, supra note 16, at 34.
105. Dame Tanni, a British Paralympian, has expressed such concerns, stating,
I don't want the Paralympics to turn into a B final.... It comes down to how the
Paralympics are portrayed. There are a pile of people out there already who think that the
Paralympics is secondary. People still say, "Are you going to the main Olympics?" not
"the Olympics and Paralympics."
I have no issue with Oscar running at grand prix meets and so on, as Oscar will bring
people into athletics. Oscar is a big story. It's just the long-term effect on the
Paralympics that I have concerns about.
Id.
1371
compared to the Olympics.106 Further, if an accommodated athlete has an
advantage over an able-bodied athlete, the same athlete may have an even
greater advantage over other athletes with disabilities.' 7 Perhaps the most
compelling argument for integration is that, from a civil rights standpoint,
prohibiting an athlete from progressing seems contrary to the victories
already won for disability rights.'0o With this in mind, the following section
examines how athletes with disabilities, who have overcome so much,
continue to face resistance when attempting to participate in able-bodied
sporting events.
IV. DISABILITY LAW APPLIED IN A SPORTS CONTEXT
While many nations have enacted disability laws, very little case law
exists interpreting how these laws apply to individuals participating in
sports. 09 Sports are generally independently regulated by individual athletic
106. See van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 103 ("The change of terminology can not
hide the huge difference in status attached to winning a medal as an able-bodied or a disabled
athlete. This difference very clearly explains the ultimate wish for a disabled athlete to become part
of the competition for elite athletes."). However, a representative of the IPC, Steffi Klein, disagrees:
"The growing media and spectator interest show[] that people are interested in the [Paralympics] and
get inspired by the athletes . . .. We do not see it as a B event." Carter, supra note 16, at 34.
107. See Edwards, supra note 84, at 123 ("If [Pistorius] has an advantage on 'able-bodied'
runners, then this is surely true in relation to the Paralympics too-at least in those races in which he
is the sole competitor using two blades."). The CAS concluded similarly that the Flex-Foot
Cheetahs® used by Pistorius have been available for a decade, and "yet no other runner using them-
either a single amputee or a double amputee-has run times fast enough to compete effectively
against able-bodied runners ..... Pistorius v. Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2008/A/1480 at
13 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport May 16, 2008) (Hunter, Rivkin & Rochat, Arbs.), available at
http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1480.pdf
108. As noted by Congress, many people with disabilities express "'fear and self-consciousness
about their disability stemming from degrading experiences they or their friends with disabilities
have experienced."' Cook, supra note 86, at 411 (quoting S. COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN
RESOURCES, REP. ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, S. Rep. No. 101-116, 7, 11 (1989)).
As a result, they "participate much less often in a host of social activities that other Americans
regularly enjoy, including going to movies, plays, sports events, and going out to eat at restaurants."
Id. (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 66, 131 (1989)).
Here, we have an athlete, Pistorius, who has not only conquered this fear in his personal life, but has
forged ahead into elite athletic competitions. It seems inconsistent to relegate him back to a
segregated event.
109. This may be due somewhat to the lack of appropriate technology to accommodate athletes
with disabilities. As technology improves, however, the number of these cases may increase. See
Alexis Chappell, Comment, Running Down a Dream: Oscar Pistorius, Prosthetic Devices, and the
Unknown Future ofAthletes with Disabilities in the Olympic Games, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE
ED. 1, at 16, 20-21 (2008), available at http://jolt.unc.edulabstracts/volume-10/ncjoltonlineed/pl6.
According to Ivo van Hilvoorde and Laurens Landeweerd, this may also be attributed to the fact that
"[tihere is no medical categorisation of disabilities that fits smoothly and logically into the context of
sport." van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 99. The IAAF and IOC's definitions of
disability derive from those set forth by the World Health Organization (WHO). See Edwards, supra
note 84, at 114. The definitions, however, are problematic and have prompted controversy.
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governing associations,110 however, these organizations have struggled to
fairly determine the eligibility of the few elite athletes who have sought
accommodation measures."' As a result, courts such as the United States
Following the WHO's introduction of the International Classification of Impairments, Disability and
Handicaps (ICIDH) in 1980, the "concept of disease and disability was heavily debated." van
Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 99, 103. Christopher Boorse based his definition of
disability on concepts of nature and normal functioning relative to nature. See id. at 99-100. In
essence, the definition derived from the difference between health, defined as "'the ability to
perform all typical physiological functions with at least typical efficiency level,"' and disease,
defined as "any state that interferes with this normal functioning." Id. at 99 (quoting Christopher
Boorse, Health as a Theoretical Concept, in 44 PHIL. SCI. 542 (1977)). Critics of this naturalist
approach, including Tristam Engelhardt, posit that heath and disease cannot be solely analyzed
according to biological principles. See id at 100. Instead, Engelhardt opts for a normative approach
to the definition of disability, considering disability a product of socio-cultural values. See id
Being disabled is not something one is by definition, but something one becomes in
relation to specific environments. Disability is enacted and ordered in situated and quite
specific ways. People can become disabled by the environment or by specific (lack of)
technologies. A person with an average intellectual ability may "become" disabled in an
environment with just highly gifted people. An elite athlete who chooses not to use
performance-enhancing substances may become dis-abled in a context in which the use
of doping is "normalised[.]" In these cases (and in many similar cases) one can argue
that one is free to choose the "right" environment in which specific qualities can be
shown and compared to "relevant others."
Id. (quoting I. Moser, Disability and the Promises of Technology: Technology, Subjectivity and
Embodiment Within an Order of the Normal, 9 INFo. COMM. & SOC'Y 373, 374 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Some would say the debate was resolved by the introduction of the
WHO's International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) in 2001. See id at
103. The ICF presented a new model, regarding disability not as a "characteristic (that is present all
the time) but a state that may be present in certain environments or resulting from specific
interactions with other people." Id. Following Engelhardt's analysis, this terminology proposes that
all people operate with abilities and disabilities, in some form. See id This analysis should also be
compared with another definition, set forth by Lennart Nordenfelt, stating that "if one can do
everything that is important to one, then one is not disabled." Edwards, supra note 84, at 114. Such
a definition is consistent with Pistorius's view that he is not disabled. See supra note 3.
110. See supra note 58 (discussing the role of organizations such as the IOC, WADA, USADA,
NBA, NFL, MLB, and NCAA in regulating sports).
111. While van Hilvoorde and Landeweerd point to this conflict between the principles of elite
sport and the rights of those with disabilities, they suggest that, viewed relative to a normal standard,
most elite athletes are disabled in some form:
What may be considered "normalisation" in the context of daily life is at least ambivalent
in the context of elite sport.... The wish of a disabled person to become part of
"normal" elite sport may be framed as a way of "inclusion" or "integration[,]"[] but this
at the same time reproduces new inequalities and asymmetries between performances of
able and dis-abled bodied.
... [H]owever, the ideal of the elite sportsman has all characteristics of abnormality as
well. But in contrast to the disabled, the elite sportsman is not considered a political and
medical burden. So on the one hand society invests quite willing in the "abnormal"
super-abilities of the elite sportsman, while on the other it does this only reluctantly, and
from a [sic] ethics of inclusion, with respect to the disabled. In the case of disabilities,
one wants to eradicate abnormalities by equalising on the basis of "sameness[,]"[] while
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Supreme Court and the Court of Arbitration for Sport have intervened,
issuing influential rulings in this novel area of law.1 12
A. The Seminal United States Case: Casey Martin
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit's decision allowing professional golfer Casey Martin". to
use a golf cart during Professional Golf Association (PGA) tournaments
despite the PGA's walking requirement.'14 After determining that the ADA
applied to Martin in his capacity as a participant,"' the Court analyzed the
in the case of super-abilities we support abnormalities. This "selective investment in the
abnormal" and the admiration for the "genetically superior" could be seen as a token of
society that cannot meet up with the criteria for justice. On the other hand, sport is a
competitive practice, whose internal logic consists of the display of an unequal
distribution of abilities. These internal goods are considered worth striving for, for their
own sake. Sport consists of an internal logic that may conflict with more societal ideals
(for example concerning justice or equality). These internal goods cannot be brought in
agreement with the ideal, for example, to create as many sport categories as possible with
the aim of producing as many sports stars as possible. It may be that everyone has certain
abilities and disabilities; we cannot however freely choose the practice in which our own
specific abilities are admired by people around the world.
van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 100-01 (citations omitted). This viewpoint illustrates
that disability is in the "eye of the beholder." Society views certain attributes, which could be
considered disabilities, as assets. This is consistent with defining disability in a normative way. See
supra note 109 (discussing the idea that all people have disabilities and that the true definition of
disability stems from whether those attributes are esteemed or despised by society).
112. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
113. Casey Martin is an American with a disability, within the meaning of the ADA. See PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 668 (2001). Martin was born with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber
Syndrome, a progressive circulatory disease that causes pain and atrophy in his right leg. Id. As a
result, Martin cannot walk an eighteen-hole golf course. Id When Martin played for Stanford
University, the Pacific Ten Conference and the NCAA waived the walking requirement to
accommodate him. Id. The PGA also waived the requirement during the first two stages of
competition, but refused to continue the accommodation when Martin reached the third stage. Id. at
669. Subsequently, Martin filed suit for injunction, permitting him to use a cart. Id.
114. Id at 690-691. But cf Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2000)
(deciding that Olinger's use of a golf cart "would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition,"
and providing that the United States Golf Association was not required to allow accommodation).
115. Martin, 532 U.S. at 681. The Court found that a golf course was a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the ADA. Id. at 677. A place of public
accommodation is defined liberally under twelve categories, and includes places such as hotels,
restaurants, banks, concert halls, convention centers, museums, libraries, social service centers,
health spas, and golf courses. See id. at 676-77 & n.24; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L)
(2006). The PGA argued that places of public accommodation need only be made equally accessible
if the person attempting to gain access is a client or customer. Martin, 532 U.S. at 678. Because
Martin was a professional golfer, the PGA maintained that his claim should be analyzed under Title I
of the ADA, which addresses employment accommodations. Id. The PGA further asserted that
because Martin was an independent contractor, he was not entitled to bring a claim against the PGA
under Title I. Id. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the clause referencing
clients or customers did not apply to the ADA as a whole, but only to a specific provision dealing
with contractual rights. Id. Further, because Martin paid the PGA an entry fee for a chance to
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modification request, balancing Martin's right to equal access with the
PGA's right to maintain the integrity of golf."6
Under Title III of the ADA,"'7 discrimination is defined as
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations." 8
Because the PGA conceded that Martin's use of a golf cart was both
reasonable and necessary," 9 the Court focused on whether his use of the cart
fundamentally altered golf as a sport. 20 The Court suggested that a sport
could be fundamentally altered in two ways.121 In the first instance,
fundamental alteration occurs if the rules of a sport are changed for
everyone, but in such a way that no reasonable person recognizes the sport
as the same game.122 In the second instance, fundamental alteration occurs
when the rules are changed in a minor way for one individual in a manner
that allows that particular individual to receive an advantage over other
participants.123 In such a case, the rules are altered in a way that does not
comport with the character of the sport.124 As Martin did not request that a
compete, he could be classified as a customer. Id at 679-80.
116. Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-91.
117. See supra note 115 (discussing why Title III is applicable in the Martin case).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added).
119. Martin, 532 U.S. at 682. The Court distinguished Martin's situation from that of a
hypothetical player with a more moderate injury, whose modification request may be reasonable, but
not necessary. See id.
120. Seeid at 682-91.
12 1. Id.
122. Id The majority borrows this definition from the Scalia dissent, which states, "I suppose
there is some point at which the rules of a well-known game are changed to such a degree that no
reasonable person would call it the same game." Id. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 682-83.
124. Id. The dissent argues that equal access does not mean an equal chance to win. See id. at
703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Simon discusses a similar argument by Ronald Dworkin:
Consider the distinction made by legal scholar Ronald Dworkin between the right to
equal treatment, "which is the right to an equal distribution of some opportunity of
resource or burden," and the right to treatment as an equal, which is the right "to be
treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else." Unlike equal treatment, equal
respect and concern do not require the identical distribution of a good, such as playing
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golf cart be permitted for every participant, the Court undertook an
individualized analysis of whether Martin's use of a cart in contravention of
the walking requirement afforded him an unfair advantage over other
competitors. 125
First, the Court determined that the walking rule is not essential to
golfl126  Second, adopting the district court's determination, the Court
declared that the purpose of the walking rule is "to subject players to
fatigue[,]" which in turn potentially influences the outcome of
tournaments.127 Third, the Court analyzed whether alteration of the rule for
time on a basketball team. Thus, if one of my children is ill and the other isn't, treatment
as an equal does not require that I divide the sick child's medicine in half. Rather, giving
all the medicine to the sick child is compatible with and may even be required by equal
respect and concern for both children. This suggests, as Dworkin maintains, that the right
to treatment as an equal, or the right to equal respect and concern, is more fundamental
ethically than the right to equal treatment. This is because factual inequalities in
distribution, or what Dworkin calls unequal treatment, may or may not be defensible
depending upon whether they are compatible with the showing of equal respect and
concern to all affected.
SIMON, supra note 28, at 33 (citations omitted).
125. The dissent argues that the PGA should not be required to undergo an individualized
analysis, warning that such a mandate would impose a significant burden on the PGA should others
attempt such a request. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority
sharply disagrees, stating, "nowhere ... does Congress limit the reasonable modification
requirement only to requests that are easy to evaluate." Id. at 691 n.53; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). Further, in the three years since Martin requested permission to use a
golf cart, no one else has sued the PGA, and only two golfers have sued the United States Golf
Association on the same issue. Martin, 532 U.S. at 691 n.53.
126. This analysis required the Court to consider the historical origins of golf. See Martin, 532
U.S. at 683-85.
[T]he use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game of
golf. From early on, the essence of the game has been shotmaking-using clubs to cause
a ball to progress from the teeing ground to a hole some distance away with as few
strokes as possible.
Id. at 683. Citing examples of amateur contests, the PGA's own Q-school events, and social golf,
the Court determined walking was not "an indispensable feature of tournament golf." Id at 685.
Further, many golfers choose to walk to relieve stress. See id. at 687-88.
127. See id at 671, 690. The Court considered testimony from some of golfs greatest players,
who discussed the purpose of the walking requirement. Jack Nicklaus testified as follows:
Q. Mr. Nicklaus, what is your understanding of the reason why in these competitive
events . .. that competitors are required to walk the course?
A. Well, in my opinion, physical fitness and fatigue are part of the game of golf.
Q. So are you telling the court that this fatigue factor tends to accumulate over the course
of the four days of the tournament?
A. Oh definitely. There's no doubt.
Id. at 670 nn.14-15 (citations omitted). Ken Venturi also testified:
Q. Does this fatigue factor that you've talked about, Mr. Venturi, affect the manner in
which you-you perform as a professional out on the golf course?
A. Oh, there's no doubt, again, but that, that fatigue does play a big part. It will
influence your game. It will influence your shot-making. It will influence your
decisions.
Q. Based on your experience, do you believe that it would fundamentally alter the nature
of the competition on the PGA Tour and the Nike Tour if competitors in those events
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Martin frustrates that purpose, thereby fundamentally altering the nature of
the golf tournament. 128  The Court agreed with the district court, which
found that "the fatigue [Martin] suffers from coping with his disability is
'undeniably greater' than the fatigue his able-bodied competitors endure
from walking the course." 29 As a result, Martin's use of a golf cart does not
contravene the purpose of the walking requirement; namely, it does not give
him a competitive advantage when taken in conjunction with his
disadvantages. 130 Thus, the Court determined that allowing Martin to use a
golf cart does not fundamentally alter golf as a sport and, as such, his use of
a cart is permitted.'31
The Supreme Court is not the only court to handle disputes concerning
disability accommodation in sports. Seven years after Martin was decided, a
similar international dispute arose.
B. The Leading International Case: Oscar Pistorius32
Oscar Pistorius's conflict with the IAAF was resolved when the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS)1 33 tackled the critical issue of determining the
were permitted to use golf carts?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. Why do you say so, sir?
A. It would-it would take away the fatigue factor in many ways. It would-it would
change the game.Q. Now, when you say that the use of carts takes away the fatigue factor, it would be an
aid, et cetera, again, as I understand it, you are not testifying now about [Martin]. You
are just talking in general terms?
A. Yes, sir.
Id. at 670 nn.15-16 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 671.
129. Id. at 672. Even with the use of a golf cart, Martin walked over a mile during an eighteen-
hole round of golf Id. at 671-72. The Supreme Court noted that he suffered significant physical
pain due to his condition. Id at 672. Additionally, the Court found that the psychological stress
Martin experienced outweighed that of the other competitors because every time he played, he risked
serious injury. Id. "To perceive that the cart puts him-with his condition-at a competitive
advantage is a gross distortion of reality." Id.
130. Id.at690-91.
131. Id. at 690 ("A modification that provides an exception to a peripheral tournament rule
without impairing its purpose cannot be said to 'fundamentally alter' the tournament.").
132. See supra, Part I (discussing the background information of the Pistorius case).
133. In the early 1980s, the number of international sports-related disputes was rising. See
Tribunal Arbitral du Sport - Court of Arbitration for Sport, History of the CAS - General
Information, Origins, http://www.tas-cas.org/history (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). Yet, there was no
independent authority specializing in sports-related disputes, which was authorized to "pronounce
binding decisions." Id. This problem led to the formation of the CAS in 1984. Id. The CAS only
hears commercial and disciplinary disputes between parties who have an arbitration agreement
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meaning of an "advantage" over another athlete.134  The CAS rejected the
proposition that the use of any technical device creates a presumptive
advantage over another athlete. 3 1
Instead, the CAS interpreted IAAF Competition Rule 144.2(e) to require
an analysis of the "overall net advantage over other athletes." 3 The CAS
considered evidence that the original IAAF investigation did not, including
tests conducted by Pistorius's own scientific experts, which showed that he
"did not have a metabolic advantage" and that he fatigued normally. 137
Pistorius's tests also evaluated the amount of energy loss from the cheetah
prostheses in comparison with the amount of energy loss from a human leg,
which the IAAF tests did not consider.'38  Ultimately, the CAS revoked the
IAAF's decision, finding insufficient evidence of a net metabolic or
biomechanical advantage.' 39  It declared Pistorius eligible to compete in
specifying the CAS as the means of recourse. See Tribunal Arbitral du Sport - Court of Arbitration
for Sport, History of the CAS - General Information, Types of Disputes Submitted to the CAS,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2010).
134. Prior to analyzing the question of advantage, the CAS rejected Pistorius's claim of unlawful
discrimination, finding that disability laws only require that entry into the competition, not
accommodation, be provided. See Pistorius v. Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2008/A/1480 at
9-10 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport May 16, 2008) (Hunter, Rivkin & Rochat, Arbs.), available at
http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1480.pdf; see also supra note
98 (discussing the CAS's determination of the issue of discrimination in the Pistorius case).
135. Pistorius, 2008/A1480 at 10-11.
136. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). "If the use of the device provides more disadvantages than
advantages, then it cannot reasonably be said to provide an advantage over other athletes, because
the user is actually at a competitive disadvantage." Id. at 10-11.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id.
139. The IAAF admitted that most of the metabolic findings were inconclusive. Id. The Panel
found the biomechanical effects to be inclusive, stating,
[Tihe scientists do not know if the fact that able-bodied runners create more vertical force
than Mr. Pistorius is an advantage or disadvantage. There is at least some scientific
evidence that sprinters, including 400m runners, train themselves to bounce more (ie,
[sic] to use more vertical force) because it creates more speed.
Id. at 13. In addition, the Panel stated that energy lost through a human ankle may be redistributed
to other body parts, but it was impractical to account for energy lost through Pistorius's prostheses
because of the prostheses' "spring-like" qualities. Id. However, the Panel continually referred to the
Flex-Foot Cheetahseo as passive devices. Hugh Herr, Associate Professor at Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, also recognized this, stating, "The prosthetic [sic] he's using is completely passive-
it's just a spring." Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 933 (quoting posting of Amber Smith to Health
& Fitness Blog, http://blog.syracuse.com/healthfitness/2007/08/todaysathleticprostheticsar.html
(Aug. 7, 2007, 0:03 EST)). Hugh argues that the human foot generates its own energy upon contact
with the ground, whereas a spring does not produce its own energy, but only returns a percentage of
the energy put in. Id. In 1987, a study of a device similar to the Flex-Foot Cheetahso showed that
the prosthesis in question had an 82% spring efficiency compared with a human foot, which
generated 241% spring efficiency. Id. This data differs from a conversation between Brtiggemann
and a German newspaper, in which Bruggemann stated that the Flex-Foot Cheetaho prosthesis
returned 90% of impact energy compared with 60% returned by the human foot. Id. This vast
difference in figures calls into question whether an accurate assessment is possible and is consistent
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IAAF-sanctioned events.140  Although the net advantage test is not error-
free,141 when viewed from a disability rights protection standpoint, the CAS
seemingly reached the right result. With this in mind, the next section will
explore whether the CAS determination preserves or destroys the essence of
competition.
C. Does Disability Accommodation Necessarily Destroy Athletic
Competition?
If the purpose of competition is the mutual quest for excellence through
challenge, accommodating a legitimate disability does not automatically
undermine this purpose.142  The question of whether accommodation
with the Panel's determination that the IAAF did not provide sufficient evidence of a distinct
advantage.
140. Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 132. The CAS explicitly declared that its decision only applied to
Pistorius while he was wearing the Flex-Foot Cheetah® that had been tested. Id. at 14. It also stated
that future scientific advances may make testing more accurate, and that sufficient evidence to show
that Pistorius's prostheses provided him a net advantage over other athletes may be available in the
future. Id. Although he was eligible to compete, Athletics South Africa did not choose Pistorius to
compete on the South African Olympic Relay Team because four other runners had faster times.
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 18, at DI. Pistorius competed in the 2008 Paralympic Games, where
he won Gold medals and set Paralympic World Records in the 100 meter, 200 meter, and 400 meter
races. See, e.g., Associated Press, Pistorius Wins Third Gold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at D2.
141. See infra Part V.B-C (discussing the shortcomings of the net advantage test and making
suggestions for improvement).
142. It is important to distinguish between accommodating a legitimate disability and simply
conferring an unfair advantage upon an athlete who may not truly need accommodation. This would
typically require a brief analysis of the definition of disability. However, the definitions in both the
ADA and the Convention are problematic. The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(l)(A) (2006). This definition has been criticized as ambiguous. For example, courts have
given the phrase "substantially limits" a "greater degree of limitation than was intended by
Congress" and have "express[ed] too high a standard." ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 2(a)(7}-(8), 122 Stat. 3553-54 (2008). Such interpretation spurred a recent
Congressional amendment, directing agencies to modify their definitions of "substantially limit" to a
less restrictive interpretation, although Congress neglected to define the phrase "less restrictive" and
essentially left the statutory language intact. Id. § 2(b)(6); see also John W. Parry & Amy L.
Allbright, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Analysis and Commentary, 32 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 695, 696 (2008) ("At the same time, however, Congress has left the most
significant problem with the original Act's definition in place by keeping the substantial limitation
language in the 'actual' prong."). International definitions have been just as ambiguous. See supra
note 109 (discussing debate over whether the WHO's definition of disability should be interpreted
from a naturalistic or normative perspective). With the ambiguity surrounding the definition of
disability, it may be difficult to determine which "disabilities" are worthy of accommodation and
which are not. Theoretically, it seems that there would be a clear line between the types of
enhancements considered permissible and those that are prohibited. See supra Part II.C. (discussing
the reasons behind permitting or prohibiting performance-enhancing substances and equipment).
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destroys competition must be addressed by considering the essence of
competition and the particular rules of each sport, both of which are
reflected in the tests set forth in the seminal cases above. The Pistorius case
focuses on whether disability accommodation provides a net advantage over
another athlete. 143  The philosophical underpinnings of this test directly
relate to concerns about compromising the nature of competition. On the
other hand, the Martin case focuses on whether disability accommodation
fundamentally alters an individual sport.144 In essence, this test determines
whether disability accommodation contravenes the specific rules of the
competition, and thus indirectly addresses the nature of competition.
In the case of Pistorius, the challenge is seemingly intact, and if
anything, it may be even greater. In deciding that Pistorius does not have a
However, while completely contrary to the ideals of sports ethics, it is possible that some athletes
could disguise attempts to gain an unfair advantage under the umbrella of disability accommodation.
The story of Kelli White (White) presents this interesting dilemma. After winning two gold medals
at the IAAF-sponsored world outdoor championships in 2003, White, an American sprinter, tested
positive for a substance called modafinil. See Greely, supra note 56, at 126-27; CBC Sports,
American Sprinter Kelli White Accepts Drug Ban (May 19, 2004),
http://www.cbc.calsports/story/2004/05/19/kelliwhite040519.html. Marketed as Provigil, modafinil
increases alertness and is commonly prescribed for sleep disorders such as narcolepsy and sleep
apnea. See Greely, supra note 56, at 127. It is used by athletes as a performance enhancer because it
provides heightened awareness without side effects commonly associated with caffeine or
amphetamines. Id However, modafinil is a non-specified stimulant banned by WADA. WADA
Rules, supra note 61, § S6(a). White, who has a family history of narcolepsy, appeared before the
IAAF, claiming she received a prescription for modafinil for a sleeping disorder. Greely, supra note
56, at 126-27. White subsequently acknowledged her modafinil use was driven by competitive
rather than health concerns, stating that other athletes were participating in doping practices. Id. at
127. Perfectly illustrating the concerns of the coercion argument proponents, White believed she
had to subscribe to a similar regimen to remain competitive. Id.; see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing that some athletes may feel forced to use performance-enhancing
substances to remain competitive). As a result of her confession, the IAAF and USADA disqualified
White's previous competitive race times, stripped her of her medals and $120,000 prize money, and
suspended her from competition for two years. See Greely, supra note 56, at 127; CBC Sports,
supra. White made a commitment to assist the USADA with its efforts to fight doping and has since
shared her story, hoping to educate other athletes and thereby curb the doping problem. See
Testimony of Sprinter Kelli White, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20050615105348-72046.pdf (last visited Feb.
16, 2010). While White now admits her use of modafinil was motivated by her desire to level the
competitive playing field, suppose she had been legitimately suffering from narcolepsy. How would
the IAAF handle such a situation? In theory, someone who suffers from a legitimate disorder should
be able to correct it, whether surgically or medicinally, and should still be able to participate in
sports or other activities. See Greely, supra note 56, at 126 ("People suffering from anemia as a
result of chemotherapy or kidney dialysis should be able to use Epogen and (if they are able)
compete; the rest of us should not."). However, opposition arises when this type of remedy does
more than level the playing field, when it creates an unfair advantage. This is exactly what the CAS
addressed when deciding Pistorius's fate. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the
CAS decision to implement a net advantage test).
143. See supra notes 1-17, 133-41 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
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conclusive advantage,145 the CAS implied that Pistorius still endures the
challenge presented by competitive running.146  Moreover, Pistorius
undoubtedly faces several difficulties that able-bodied competitors do not.147
Likewise, in the Martin case, the Supreme Court determined that the
walking rule is designed to subject players to fatigue. Because Martin
experiences such fatigue while possibly enduring even greater mental and
physical stress,148 the challenge remains undiminished.
145. Indeed, these advantages and disadvantages were not conclusively determined by some of the
top biomechanics experts in the world. See supra notes 12, 139 (explaining that the test results
produced by Professor Briiggemann on behalf of the LAAF were inconsistent with the test results
produced by Pistorius's team of scientists). Peter Charlish and Stephen Riley question whether a
proper determination is possible, asking,
[I]s it possible to quantify the disadvantages that Pistorius has suffered throughout his life
and continues to suffer as a direct result of his disability? Just as Pistorius suffers no
fatigue in his legs below his knees, similarly he is only able to produce propulsive effects
via muscles above his knees. The likely net effect of his particular personal
circumstances must be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accurately quantify.
Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 936.
146. Pistorius v. Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2008/A/1480 at 13 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport
May 16, 2008) (Hunter, Rivkin & Rochat, Arbs.), available at http://jurisprudence.tas-
cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1480.pdf. Pistorius's efforts may be overlooked when
his victories are attributed to the use of prosthetic devices, rather than to his dedication. Ample
Louw, Pistorius's coach, says, "Insufficient credit is given to Pistorius's resolve in the weight room
and on the track." Longman, supra note 3, at Al. Louw describes one of Pistorius's intense
workouts as follows: "[It] requires him to run 350 meters in 42 seconds; 300 meters in 34.6 seconds;
200 meters in 22 seconds and 150 meters in 15.4 seconds." Id. "The kid is a born
champion.. . .He doesn't settle for second best." Id S.D. Edwards also points to such dedication,
stating,
[A]s well as overcoming considerable levels of prejudice and disadvantage due to his
disability, [Pistorius] is as dedicated and trains as hard as any top athlete. The blades are
mere means that make it possible for him to manifest his athletic prowess in his chosen
events; they compensate for his lack of legs.
Edwards, supra note 84, at 115. For further discussion on the issue of compensation or restoration,
see supra note 84.
147. Even Pistorius's fellow Olympic athletes recognize the obstacles he has overcome to be
considered an elite athlete. Former British Olympian Iwan Thomas states, "I think [Pistorius] should
be allowed to run. I don't think it's an issue .... I know there have been studies and stuff, but I
cannot see how not having any lower legs can give him any form of advantage." Carter, supra note
16, at 32. Justin Gatlin, an able-bodied Olympic 100-meter sprinter, states,
If you can reach the time legally? You should be able to run.... I'll race those guys.
Marlon and [Pistorius] are pioneers. In a couple years you'll see Paralympians running
times almost equivalent to mine. I take my hat off to them. They work twice as hard as
me, and they have a lot more to worry about.
The Archrival: South African Teenager Oscar Pistorius Has Passed Shirley in the 200 Meters--and
Incurred His Wrath, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 23, 2005, at 58, available at
http://vault.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG 1111353/index.htm.
148. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
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It is evident that these cases and the legal tests within them reflect both
the fundamental policies underlying disability accommodation and the
essential principles associated with preserving the integrity of sports. While
the net advantage and fundamental alteration tests deliberately endeavor to
preserve the integrity of individual sports, they do not explicitly attempt to
integrate athletes with disabilities. When applied to Martin and Pistorius,
however, the results have the effect of integration. Thus, the tests seemingly
strike a proper balance between preserving athletic competition and
promoting disability rights.
V. THE CORRECT RESULT WITH AN INEFFICIENT APPLICATION
Although the fundamental alteration and net advantage tests
successfully balance the competing interests at hand and seem to reach a
correct result, these tests can nevertheless be greatly improved. This section
identifies the tests' various shortcomings and presents an alternative
approach with a more accurate outcome.
A. The Fundamental Alteration Test: Subjective and Inconsistentl4 9
The purpose of the fundamental alteration test as applied to sportsso is
to determine if the essence of the particular sport in question has been
altered. Such an analysis first requires a court to identify the essence that
should be protected.1' This first step can present problems before a court
149. Applying the fundamental alteration test under the ADA presumes that the athlete's
requested accommodations are both reasonable and necessary, and that the forum in question is a
place of public accommodation. See supra notes 115-19. Because most legitimate athletic
accommodation requests are reasonable and necessary and most athletic competitions occur in places
of public accommodation, this Comment concentrates on the fundamental alteration element of the
ADA, and relies on it as the true "test" to be applied in this context.
150. The fundamental alteration test is not just applied to sports, but derives specifically from the
language of the ADA, which seeks to prevent discrimination in employment, places of public
accommodation, government programs, and the like. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (2006).
[D]iscrimination includes . .. a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations.
42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Because, in Martin, the PGA conceded that
Martin's accommodations were both reasonable and necessary and the Supreme Court determined
that the PGA tournament constituted a place of public accommodation, it applied the fundamental
alteration test. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
151. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001). The Supreme Court noted that
"[a]s an initial matter . .. the use of carts [was] not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character
of the game of golf." Id. The Court further defined the essence of golf, according to the rules, as
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even begins to analyze whether the alleged violation of a particular rule
undermines this essence. In the Martin case, the Supreme Court did not face
a difficult determination because, according to the majority opinion, the
essence of golf is easily determined from golf s constitutive rules.152 The
dissent, however, sarcastically criticizes this conclusion, implying that the
duty to define golf should in no way rest with the courts."s3 Along the same
lines of the dissent's argument, a more complicated situation would arise
"shotmaking." Id.
152. The Court delved into the history of golf and the Rules of Golf, which state, "The Game of
Golf consists in playing a ball from the teeing ground into the hole by a stroke or successive strokes
in accordance with the rules." Id. at 684. The Court cited several changes in the way the clubs are
transported, beginning with the addition of golf bags, moving to caddies, and finally to golf carts.
Id. at 685. Additionally, the Court noted the positive effects of golf carts on the sport, namely that
the speed of play is increased and that golf carts produce revenue for the game. Id The Court
determined that nothing in the original rules of golf prevented or discouraged a player from using a
golf cart, and as a result, such activity should not be prohibited. Id
153. Justice Scalia's dissent states,
[W]e Justices must confront what is indeed an awesome responsibility. It has been
rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States, laid upon it by
Congress in pursuance of the Federal Government's power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States" . . . to decide What Is Golf. I am sure that
the Framers of the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of King James II of Scotland
prohibiting golf because it interfered with the practice of archery, fully expected that
sooner or later the paths of golf and government, the law and the links, would once again
cross, and that the judges of this august Court would some day have to wrestle with that
age-old jurisprudential question, for which their years of study in the law have so well
prepared them: Is someone riding around a golf course from shot to shot really a golfer?
The answer, we learn, is yes. The Court ultimately concludes, and it will henceforth be
the Law of the Land, that walking is not a "fundamental" aspect of golf.
Martin, 532 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). While determining the essence of
a sport may seem like a fairly easy task, the question of whether Supreme Court Justices should be
given the authority to create definitions, as opposed to interpreting them, is an important one. While
Justices often make complicated determinations on subject-matter for which they lack professional
training, such a practice would raise concerns of how accurate the Justices' definitions might be. A
similar, yet much more complicated, analogy can be drawn to issues of claim construction in patent
law cases. Currently, the United States legal system allows for patent cases to be brought in federal
district courts, subject to appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over such appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
According to an empirical study conducted by Kimberley Moore, an Associate Professor of Law at
George Mason University School of Law, thirty-three percent of cases appealed to the Federal
Circuit were subject to an improper claim construction determination at the district court level.
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 1-2 (2001). Moore suggests that such an error rate raises doubts about the abilities of
district court judges to properly adjudicate complex patent issues. See id. at 3. While patent law is
admittedly much more complex, similar doubts are raised concerning the accuracy of definitions as
they pertain to sports. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Olinger v. United States Golf Association,
205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), "the decision on whether the rules of the game should be adjusted to
accommodate [Olinger] is best left to those who hold the future of golf in trust." Id at 1007.
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should a sport neglect to clearly define its essence within its rules.15 4 The
Pistorius case presents such an obstacle.155  The IAAF has not specifically
154. Legislatures could require each individual sport, and each league within those sports, to
define the essence of the sport. However, asking athletic governing organizations to self-regulate is
not an easy task. Consider the kind of pressure Congress was forced to place on Major League
Baseball before the league agreed to intensify steroid regulations. Upon reviewing the league's drug
policies, a House Committee found that the guidelines were extremely lenient. See Duff Wilson &
Michael S. Schmidt, Baseball Braces for Tough Report from Mitchell, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at
Dl. "The penalty for a first offense was actually a 10-day suspension or a fine. If a player was only
fined, he would not be identified." Id Members of Congress were outraged as they felt that the
league had misled them about the substance of the policies. See id. Subsequently, Bud Selig, the
league's commissioner, "wrote the union to ask for a new steroids policy, 'three strikes and you're
out.' It would apply a 50-game suspension for a first offense, 100 games for a second offense and a
lifetime ban for a third offense." Id. Selig's suggestion was approved in December 2005. See id.
Selig appointed former Congressman George Mitchell to conduct an investigation three months
later. See id. While Major League Baseball's drug policies have certainly evolved, the process has
been slow. It seems that to require each sport to undertake a similar process in creating definitions
for each activity within a sport would be just as laborious, and very impractical. Further, ultimate
adjudication of the constitutionality of such definitions would rest with the courts, thereby coming
around full-circle. It seems if the fundamental alteration test were applied, it would save much
hassle to simply allow the courts, through consideration of tradition and standards for each sport, to
create definitions in the first place. But see discussion supra note 153 (discussing the problems
associated with courts defining the essence of sports). This specific problem is addressed infra Part
V.
155. The lack of a proper definition makes it difficult to determine if Pistorius is participating in
the sport of running. See van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 99, 106 ("This debate
cannot, however, be detached from the more conceptual question on the definition of running, and
what could still be considered a norm for (human) running."); see also Edwards, supra note 84, at
120 ("[T]he proper focus of the debate should be whether or not what [Pistorius] does counts as
running. Only if it does can he legitimately compete in a running race."). Justice Scalia's dissent in
Martin posed the idea that the rules of a sport could change so drastically that one would not
recognize the activity as the same sport. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. van Hilvoorde
and Landeweerd present an analysis similar to Scalia's concept, but framed specifically to address
Pistorius's situation:
The question is whether Pistorius is playing the same game as his opponents. We argue
that he is not because he is showing another and extra skill, namely handling his
prosthesis [sic] in an extremely talented way. Prostheses may have a considerable
influence on the outcome of the game. This, however, is not an argument in itself that
this competition should be excluded from the regular Olympic Games.
van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, supra note 1, at 99, 108 (emphasis added). While the definition of
running is ambiguous, fundamentally, Pistorius's limbs, although prosthetic, move in the same
"running" motion as human limbs. Consider the following two definitions of the word "running."
Richard Weil, an exercise physiologist, defines running as going "steadily by springing steps so that
both feet leave the ground for an instant in each step. That's the key: both feet are in the air at once.
During walking, one foot is always on the ground. Jogging is running slowly, and sprinting is
running fast." Richard Weil, Running (Jogging), http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?
articlekey-82015 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). Accordingly, if Pistorius's prostheses are considered
"feet," his actions would be running. Whether Pistorius's prosthetic devices can be defined as such
remains an unanswered question. Consider the following statement by Leon Feliser, a general
manager of the South African Olympic Committee: "'The rule book says a foot has to be in contact
with the starting block. . . . What is the definition of a foot? Is a prosthetic device a foot, or is it an
actual foot?"' Longman, supra note 3, at Al.
The only explicit direction from the IAAF regarding the definition of an athletic sport similar
to running comes from IAAF Rule 230, which defines "race walking" as
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defined running or sprinting.' 6  If such a determination were presented to a
court, the court would be required to engage in a subjective analysis,
independently determining the essence of running.
Subjectivity exists not only in defining the sport but also in defining the
advantages and disadvantages each athlete faces. The Martin court, while
probably correct in its determination, found that Martin faces serious
physical and psychological disadvantages.15 7  This conclusion, however,
appears to be based on judicial observations rather than scientific
evidence. 58  If possible, such observations should be supported with
scientific data, thereby increasing the objectivity and consistency of judicial
rulings.
Because the fundamental alteration test is inherently subjective, it is also
prone to producing contradictory results. Approximately one year prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Martin, the Seventh Circuit issued a ruling
that barred professional golfer Ford Olinger (Olinger) from using a golf cart
during United States Golf Association (USGA) tournaments." 9 Similar to
a progression of steps so taken that the walker makes contact with the ground, so that no
visible (to the human eye) loss of contact occurs. The advancing leg shall be straightened
(i.e. not bent at the knee) from the moment of first contact with the ground until the
vertical upright position.
Int'l Ass'n Athletics Fed'ns, Competition Rules, R. 230 (2008), available at
http://www.iaaf.org/mm/Document/imported/ 4 2 192.pdf. Reverse engineering this definition might
be helpful. Running could seemingly be defined as a progression of steps taken so that the runner
loses contact with the ground. Under this definition, Pistorius would seemingly be running as well.
156. Perhaps this is because the concept of running seems very straightforward. It is possible that,
similar to mountain climbing, discussed supra note 44, running does not have a set of distinct
constitutive rules, which clearly define it. Mountain climbing isn't just about getting to the top, but
about doing so by climbing and employing strategies confined by the bounds of nature, not the rules.
See supra note 44. Running could be defined similarly, as an attempt to get to the finish line as fast
as possible by using one's legs (whether human or prosthetic).
157. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting Martin's psychological stress and
physical pain associated with his disability).
158. The Martin court simply recites observations made by the district court, without reference to
any sort of testing. According to the district court judge,
[P]laintiff is in significant pain when he walks, and even when he is getting in and out of
the cart. With each step, he is at risk of fracturing his tibia and hemorrhaging. The other
golfers have to endure the psychological stress of competition as part of their fatigue;
Martin has the same stress plus the added stress of pain and risk of serious injury. As he
put it, he would gladly trade the cart for a good leg. To perceive that the cart puts him-
with his condition-at a competitive advantage is a gross distortion of reality.
Martin, 532 U.S. at 672. While there is no question that these observations are indeed true, they
remain observations and, as such, do not have the force or weight of scientific data.
159. Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000). Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Martin, the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling in Martin's favor. See Martin, 532 U.S.
at 674 ("the day after the Ninth Circuit ruled in Martin's favor, the Seventh Circuit came to a
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Martin, Olinger, whose condition significantly impairs his ability to walk, 60
is considered a person with a disability under the ADA.161  The Seventh
Circuit's fundamental alteration analysis was markedly similar to the
Supreme Court's analysis in Martin, assessing such factors as the purpose of
the walking requirement and its effect on the game of golf.162  The two
cases, however, produced conclusions that could not be more opposite. The
Olinger court considered testimony of professional golfers and the traditions
of golf and concluded that "[t]he accommodation ... while reasonable in a
general sense, would alter the fundamental nature of [the U.S. Open]," 63
whereas the Martin court determined that, because of its peripheral nature,
modifying the walking requirement would not fundamentally alter the sport
of golf.IM Such a drastic difference with such similar facts suggests that the
test itself is problematic when applied in a sports context. Perhaps courts
should apply a test that bases its results on more objective criteria.
B. The Net Advantage Test: An Improvement, but Difficult to Apply
The net advantage test, although flawed, provides a much more
objective approach to determining whether an athlete should be
accommodated. This objectivity is attributed to the fact that the net
advantage test focuses on the athlete rather than the sport,16 ' and the fact that
it relies not on philosophical definitions, but on extensive scientific data and
analyses to reach conclusions.166  Although an argument can be made that
the net advantage test also produces inconsistent results, these
inconsistencies are not attributable to the test itself, but rather to the facts
given in support of each argument.16 7 Drastic discrepancies in factual expert
contrary conclusion in [Olinger].").
160. Olinger has been diagnosed with bilateral avascular necrosis, a degenerative condition that
causes him significant difficulty when walking. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 674 n.19.
161. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001.
162. See id. at 1006--07.
163. Id. at 1006.
164. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
165. If the true aim of athletic competition is a "mutual quest for excellence through challenge," it
seems appropriate to focus on whether the particular athlete continues to face the challenge, rather
than to focus on whether or not the sport itself has been altered. See SIMON, supra note 28, at 27; see
also supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of a "mutual quest for excellence
through challenge"). Additionally, the ADA, from which the fundamental alteration test is derived,
calls for an individual assessment of the athlete. See infra note 177. Arguably, a test that
encompasses an analysis of both the individual athlete and the individual sport could be devised.
However, the net advantage test virtually encompasses the idea of the fundamental alteration test.
By testing the individual athlete and ensuring that an unfair advantage is avoided, the net advantage
test ensures that the sport is not fundamentally altered.
166. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting consideration of both biomechanical and
metabolic evidence to determine whether a net advantage exists).
167. See supra note 139 (discussing the drastically different results reached by the IAAF's experts
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findings, however, are not uncommon in legal disputes, nor are they
inconsistent with a traditional adversarial legal system. As a result, such
contradictory evidence does not necessitate abandonment of the net
advantage test.
Although in theory the net advantage test appears to provide a much
more reliable outcome, in practice, the test poses many problems for athletes
with disabilities and for athletic governing organizations (AGOs). First,
while the net advantage test is objectively based in science, it lacks a
specific set of factors to support its standard, which may cause confusion as
to what exactly should be tested. 168  The CAS noted this ambiguity when
discussing the tests conducted by the IAAF's experts and Pistorius's
experts.169 However, the court failed to remedy this confusion by providing
a set of factors to consider. 170  Second, the test requires a significant time
commitment on the part of both the athletes and the AGOs. In addition to
the normal constraints of litigation,17 1 the extensive series of tests and
scientific analysis may cause an athlete to miss important competitive
athletic events. 172 This may indeed be the situation with regard to Pistorius,
who was declared ineligible in January 2008, and received a final ruling
and Pistorius's experts).
168. See Chappell, supra note 109, at 24 (noting the "miscommunication surrounding the factors
to be tested").
169. The CAS noted the confusion experienced in testing Pistorius's prostheses:
Professor Briggemann made it clear that he did not believe that his mandate was to
determine all of the advantages and disadvantages of running with the Cheetah Flex-Foot
prosthesis. It was to determine whether or not it provided an advantage on the measures
he was asked to undertake. It follows, in the view of the Panel, that the Cologne Report
does not answer the question that the Panel is required to decide. This is not the fault of
Professor Bruiggemann, whom the panel regards as a scientist having expertise and
integrity. It originates from the mission he was given by the IAAF.
Pistorius v. Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2008/A/1480 at 7 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport May 16,
2008) (Hunter, Rivkin & Rochat, Arbs.), available at http://jurisprudence.tas-
cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1480.pdf.
170. Chappell, supra note 109, at 26 ("The court missed an opportunity to enumerate the factors
the IAAF should consider when evaluating prosthetics [sic] for eligibility under its amended rules of
competition."). Even if the CAS had identified factors, its ruling would not be binding on United
States courts. Nonetheless, that does not mean that United States courts cannot learn from the CAS
test. In fact, because it is more accurate, perhaps United States lawmakers should consider
amending the ADA to include a similar provision for competitive athletics.
171. See Chappell, supra note 109, at 22 (noting that the "need for legal representation and the
costs of testing and appearing before the CAS [may] deter athletes with disabilities from seeking
approval to compete in IAAF-sanctioned events").
172. While the original IAAF tests lasted only two days (November 12-13, 2007), Pistorius was
required to respond to the test results within one month's time and underwent his own tests in
February 2008. Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 4, 8, 12.
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from the CAS in May 2008.' During this four-month period when he
fought a draining legal battle, Pistorius missed valuable training sessions,
which may have cost him a seat on the South African Olympic team.174
Third, the financial burden of litigation 75 and extensive testing,17 whether
assigned to the athlete or the AGO, is significant. Fourth, it has been argued
that AGOs do not have the resources to conduct individualized testing on
every athlete with a disability who requests accommodation.'77 While these
173. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
174. See Chappell, supra note 109, at 22. Peet Van Zyl, Pistorius's agent commented,
[Pistorius] knew it was going to be tough and he gave it his best shot. One can't expect
more of a guy who has had about 9 to 10 weeks to train.
We had to be in court; we had to fly to Europe for tests; we had to fly to Germany for
tests . . .. You can't train all the time and see your coach all the time, so of course it had a
negative effect.
Robinson, supra note 18, at DI. Indeed, Robinson observes that "[a] year of distractions off
the track might have taken a toll." Id. It has also been noted that "[w]hen physical training is
markedly reduced or stopped for a period longer than 4 weeks, the VO [the maximal
oxygen intake] of highly trained athletes declines by 6 to 20% .... In addition, long term
inactivity may promote a decline in cardiac dimensions and ventilator efficiency. . . ."
Chappefl, supra note 109, at 22 n.39 (quoting liligo Mujika & Sabino Padilla, Detraining: Loss
of Training-Induced Physiological and Performance Adaptions, 30 SPORTS MED. 145, 145
(2000)).
175. While Pistorius was represented by Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP on a pro bono basis, other
athletes may not have this luxury. See Chappell, supra note 109, at 21 & n.31. In addition to legal
representation costs, court costs-such as the 500 Swiss francs required to file an appeal with the
CAS and costs for expert witnesses-are cumbersome. See id at 22. Finally, travel to and lodging
in Lausanne, Switzerland, the location of the CAS offices, is expensive. See id
176. The IAAF expended approximately 630,000 on initial testing of Pistorius and his prosthetic
devices. See id
177. Because the CAS holding is limited to Pistorius individually, and applies to him only when
he uses the Flex-Foot Cheetaho prostheses, there is great potential for continued litigation. See
Pistorius, 2008/A/1480 at 14. Should Pistorius desire to use other prosthetic devices, the IAAF, and
potentially the CAS, would have to issue a new decision based on a new set of testing results. See
Chappell, supra note 109, at 22. Additionally, other athletes who use prostheses will have to endure
similar testing should the IAAF challenge their eligibility. See id at 22-23. While such a burden
may at first seem daunting, the Supreme Court in Martin addressed similar concerns posed by the
PGA. See Martin, 532 U.S. 661, at 690-91 n.53.
[W]e think petitioner's contention that the task of assessing requests for modifications
will amount to a substantial burden is overstated. As Martin indicates, in the three years
since he requested the use of a cart, no one else has sued the PGA, and only two other
golfers (one of whom is Olinger) have sued the USGA for a waiver of the walking rule.
In addition, we believe petitioner's point is misplaced, as nowhere in § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)
does Congress limit the reasonable modification requirement only to requests that are
easy to evaluate.
Id. (emphasis added). Scalia's dissent in Martin criticizes such an individual application, stating,
[Fluture cases of this sort will be numerous, and a rich source of lucrative litigation. One
can envision the parents of a Little League player with attention deficit disorder trying to
convince a judge that their son's disability makes it at least 25% more difficult to hit a
pitched ball. (If they are successful, the only thing that could prevent a court order giving
the kid four strikes would be a judicial determination that, in baseball, three strikes are
metaphysically necessary, which is quite absurd.)
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shortcomings do not require that the net advantage test be completely
rejected, together they reveal a need to further define the test's components.
C. Remedying the Ambiguities ofAdvantage Testing
As alluded to above, the principal criticism of the net advantage test is
directed toward its vague approach to resolving the issue of disability
accommodation in the context of sports. Specifically, one of the major flaws
of the net advantage test lies in the fact that it lacks proper factors to
determine whether an athlete is or is not gaining a net advantage. 7 ' A
proper test might include a combination of factors similar to those tested by
the IAAF's experts and Pistorius's experts. For example, such factors could
encompass: (1) evidence of increased maneuverability, (2) the amount of
metabolic energy expended, (3) the amount of oxygen consumed, (4) a
comparison of energy loss through a prosthetic limb as compared to a human
limb, and (5) fatigue experienced by the athlete as compared to other elite
athletes.179 While this list of factors is not exhaustive, it certainly provides
more direction than the current standard.
Id. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority opinion takes issue with Scalia's critique of the
individualized inquiry. In fact, the majority claims that both the express language and the
underlying purpose of the ADA call for an individualized inquiry.
Petitioner's refusal to consider Martin's personal circumstances in deciding whether to
accommodate his disability runs counter to the clear language and purpose of the ADA.
As previously stated, the ADA was enacted to eliminate discrimination against
"individuals" with disabilities, and to that end Title III of the Act requires without
exception that any "policies, practices, or procedures" of a public accommodation be
reasonably modified for disabled "individuals" as necessary to afford access unless doing
so would fundamentally alter what is offered. To comply with this command, an
individualized inquiry must be made to determine whether a specific modification for a
particular person's disability would be reasonable under the circumstances as well as
necessary for that person, and yet at the same time not work a fundamental alteration.
Id. at 688 (citations omitted). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 340 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303 ("[E]ntities are required to make ... decisions based on facts applicable to
individual applicants"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) ("[W]hether a
person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry.").
178. Because the intersection of sports with disability rights is such a novel and undeveloped area
of law, the CAS may have been reluctant to articulate a set of specific factors. Additionally, because
the evidence presented by the IAAF's experts was so drastically different from the evidence
presented by Pistorius's experts, the CAS was able to simply issue a ruling based on inconclusive
findings, thereby avoiding the daunting task of formulating a specific test, which would undoubtedly
be subject to intense scrutiny. See supra note 139 (discussing that the inconclusive results mandated
a finding of eligibility).
179. See Chappell, supra note 109, at 26. The factors set forth in this Comment are not identical
to those tested by the IAAF's and Pistorius's experts, as those factors were tailored specifically to
running with prosthetic devices. Because the net advantage test should be designed to encompass
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Once factors have been established, other issues with such a test may be
quickly resolved through simple regulatory measures. The lack of guidance
as to appropriate timing, i.e., the point in the competition process when this
type of challenge to an athlete's eligibility should be asserted, could be
remedied simply by scheduling the evaluation process at the outset of an
athlete's career, so as not to disrupt training to the detriment of the athlete.
While this may impose more burdens on AGOs because of the sheer volume
of athletes who would require testing,so such an approach would eliminate
missed opportunities and gaps in performance.'' In any case, even if the
number of athletes requiring such testing increases, the immediate
encumbrance will not be so high as to create an undue burden for AGOs.'82
Further, if athletes who have already been tested and approved to compete
wish to change their prosthetic devices, they may elect to do so, knowing
that further testing and litigation may disrupt their careers in the future.183 In
deciding whether the athlete or the AGO should bear the cost of initial
testing, drafters of such a regulatory provision should consider that a
requirement for an athlete to bear costs above and beyond the equipment
sports and disabilities other than those tested in the Pistorius case, to the extent possible, the ideal
net advantage factors should be universally applicable. If the factors strictly mimicked those tested
by the IAAF's and Pistorius's experts, significant problems would arise with cross-application
among different sports. For example, suppose a prosthetic device was developed that allowed an
athlete improved lateral movement. In running, this may not make a significant impact. However,
in a sport such as basketball, improved lateral movement would have a dramatic effect, and could
potentially produce an unfair advantage. Moreover, in a situation involving lateral movement, a
factor testing vertical force, which was tested in the Pistorius case, may be inapposite.
180. In Martin, the Supreme Court did not think that so many golfers would request
accommodation as to constitute an undue burden on golf associations. See supra note 177 and
accompanying text. The language of the ADA provides,
[A] failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a
disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than
other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity
can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good,
service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in
an undue burden ....
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added). At least one author has speculated that the
number of competitive athletes with disabilities will increase. "With more and more soldiers
returning from Afghanistan and Iraq with disabling injuries and high-tech fixes, the population of
disabled American athletes is growing as a faster rate than anything since the Vietnam war."
Charlish & Riley, supra note 7, at 939 (quoting Steve Goldberg, Do Disabled Athletes Have an
Edge?, TIME, June 8, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1631050,00.htm). Without more, testing should be mandatory, that is, until AGOs can
demonstrate beyond speculation that an undue burden will be imposed.
181. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting that Pistorius may have missed qualifying
for the 2008 Beijing Olympics due to extensive testing and litigation surrounding his dispute with
the IAAF).
182. See supra note 180 (discussing that any entity must demonstrate an undue burden before
being relieved of a duty to accommodate).
183. See supra notes 140, 177 (discussing the limitations of the CAS's holding with regard to
Pistorius and the possible implications should Pistorius request to use new prostheses).
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itself may constitute a form of discrimination.184 Consequently, placing this
burden on AGOs seems more appropriate.ss In the event that an athlete
contests an AGO's ruling, however, this cost of litigation should remain with
the athlete until the litigation has been resolved, in which case costs and
attorneys' fees should be awarded to the prevailing party.186  Simple
guidelines such as these provide athletes and AGOs with proper direction to
carry out what is currently an ambiguous test.
The foregoing remedies support the underlying philosophy of the net
advantage test, which seeks to balance the interests of both athletes and
AGOs in promoting disability accommodation and preserving the integrity
184. The Code of Federal Regulations prohibits surcharges imposed against persons with
disabilities.
A public accommodation may not impose a surcharge on a particular individual with a
disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures,
such as the provision of auxiliary aids, barrier removal, alternatives to barrier removal,
and reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, that are required to
provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act
or this part.
28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (2009). As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, "surcharges against disabled people
constitute facial discrimination." Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1171 (1999). In evaluating
whether a fee constitutes a surcharge, it must be determined whether such a fee is imposed to satisfy
a mandate of the ADA. See id. If the charge is not to fulfill ADA requirements, the inquiry ends.
See id If the fee is intended to fulfill ADA requirements, it must be determined whether it
constitutes a charge that nondisabled people would not incur. If nondisabled people pay
the same fee for an equivalent service, the charge to disabled people would not constitute
a surcharge on a "required" measure. Thus, for example, a state can charge a fee for
disabled license plates so long as it charges the same fee for nondisabled license plates.
Id
185. Chappell, supra note 109, at 27 ("If the IAAF thought amending its rules of competition to
define devices was important, it should also bear the costs of fulfilling its duty to ensure that all
competitors play by the rules."). This line of thinking is consistent with the ADA's mandate that
reasonable accommodation be provided unless there is an imposition of an undue burden. See supra
note 180. It is clear from the language of the ADA that the public accommodation, i.e., the entity
enacting the policies, should provide (meaning "pay for") the accommodation. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). Alternatively, it may seem prudent to have equipment manufacturers
bear the costs of initial testing because they are profiting from sales of such equipment. One could
envision testing occurring as a part of a company's research and development department. However,
this would undoubtedly cause an uproar amongst the manufacturers. Considering companies have
lodged objections to equipment bans, which have been imposed for safety reasons, it is likely that
additional costs associated with testing would be vehemently contested. See supra note 76
(discussing litigation between equipment manufacturers and athletic governing organizations over
proposed regulations). Further, antitrust laws may be implicated. See id.
186. This type of cost burden analysis conforms to standard United States litigation principles,
which typically require plaintiffs to finance litigation until there is a determination of liability in the
action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(2). Typically costs are awarded to the prevailing party, and
attorneys' fees can be recovered by a request to the court in the form of a motion. See id.
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of sport. Additionally, these suggestions contemplate a more accurate result,
which ultimately benefits all interested parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Civil rights activists continually demand recognition of basic rights to
equal access, an endeavor which should not cease simply because sports are
involved. If the rules must change or if society's view of acceptable sports
practices must be altered, so be it.'87 For if change is not forthcoming, then
it is possible that there will be no place for athletes like Oscar Pistorius.
Indeed, if Pistorius is banned from able-bodied events, but is too competitive
for disabled events, he is effectively left without a forum to display his
athletic talent.'88 Such an injustice can hardly be acceptable, for "[t]hrough
birth or circumstance, some are given certain gifts, but it's what one does
with those gifts, the hours devoted to training, the desire to be the best, that
is the true heart of a champion."' 89 With that in mind, the judicial process
owes champions like Pistorius the right to a fair and accurate determination
of eligibility-a determination based on objective criteria, which not only
seeks to preserve the essence of a sport, but also properly advances
fundamental civil liberties in the process.
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187. In discussing normative arguments against performance enhancement, Michael Shapiro
states, "[s]ooner or later we must ask whether the norms in question ought to be vindicated."
Shapiro, supra note 55, at 53. It certainly would not be the first time sports have undergone a
transition to further civil rights. See supra note 22 (discussing how the introduction of minority
athletes, such as Jackie Robinson, in sports had a powerful impact on the racial civil rights
movement).
188. See supra note 84 (discussing the possibility that if Pistorius has an advantage over able-
bodied athletes, he may also have an advantage over other athletes with disabilities).
189. Erik Weihenmayer, Oscar Pistorius, TIME, May 12, 2008, at 64, available at
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1733748_1733756_1735285,00.html.
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